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Abstract
Assume that it is your evidence that determines what opinions you should have.
I argue that since you should take peer disagreement seriously, evidence must have
two features. (1) It must sometimes warrant being modest : uncertain what your
evidence warrants, and (thus) uncertain whether you’re rational. (2) But it must
always warrant being guided : disposed to treat your evidence as a guide. It is
surprisingly difficult to vindicate these dual constraints. But diagnosing why this
is so leads to a proposal—Trust—that is weak enough to allow modesty but strong
enough to yield many guiding features. In fact, I argue that Trust is the Goldilocks
principle—for it is necessary and sufficient to vindicate the claim that you should
always prefer to use free evidence. Upshot: Trust lays the foundations for a theory
of disagreement and, more generally, an epistemology that permits self-doubt—a
modest epistemology.
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1 A Modest Guide
Here is a spoon:
And here is another:
Which spoon is longer? Let Top be the claim that the top one is. There are opinions you
should have about Top—perhaps you should be confident of it. There are opinions you
should have about many other propositions as well. I will assume that it is your evidence
that makes it so. But I am neutral beyond that—all I assume is that your evidence
determines what opinions you should have. Thus: You should (would be rational to)
have an opinion iff your evidence warrants having that opinion.1 Epistemology studies
evidence. And this paper studies its structure.
Two structural features, in fact.
One. Your evidence determines what you ought to think. Yet you are a fallible
critter—and you know it. Even in simple cases, you might misjudge the force of your
evidence: although you’re pretty confident of Top (let’s suppose), maybe it should be
obvious that the top spoon is longer (you’re underconfident)—or maybe you’re being
tricked by its shape (you’re overconfident). You’re aware of your fallibility, so you
have evidence that requires being unsure whether you’ve properly conformed to your
evidence. That’s our first structural feature:
1Assumption Alert : (1) I will use precise probabilities to model rational opinions (cf. White 2009a;
Elga 2010; Joyce 2010); and (2) I will assume that your evidence always warrants a unique opinion
(cf. White 2005; Feldman 2007; Schoenfield 2014). These are modeling choices: (1) however we represent
rational opinions, it will be rational to be unsure what the rational opinion is; and (2) whatever features
(evidence, priors, etc.) collectively determine a uniquely rational opinion, they will need the structural
features I discuss. I understand these assumptions to be descriptive idealizations—like point-particles
on frictionless planes—not normative ones. They are intended to provide simplified models of how you
and I ought to think, rather than exact models of how our ideal counterparts would.
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Modest Truism
Your evidence sometimes requires being modest : uncertain what your evidence
requires.
Let ‘P ’ be a definite description that picks out the credences—whatever they are—that
are warranted by your evidence. P captures the opinions you should have about any rel-
evant proposition; thus it captures the first-order opinions you should have about Top,
as well as the higher-order opinions you should have about what first-order opinions
you should have about Top. Our Modest Truism says that such first- and higher-
order opinions should sometimes come apart—sometimes you should have credence t
in p but be less than certain that you should: P (p) = t, but P (P (p) = t) < 1. Maybe
you should be 0.7 confident of Top: P (Top) = 0.7. But you definitely shouldn’t be
certain that you should be—you should leave open that you should be 0.6 or 0.8 in-
stead: P (P (Top) = 0.6) > 0 and P (P (Top) = 0.8) > 0.2
Two. Your evidence determines what you ought to think. Arguably, this means
that you must have reason to treat your evidence as a guide: your higher-order opinions
about what you ought to think about Top should constrain your first-order opinions
about Top. That’s our second (not yet fully precise) structural feature:
Guiding Truism
Your evidence always warrants being guided : disposed to treat your evidence as a
guide.
There are many things you should be disposed to treat as guides—chances (Lewis 1980),
gurus (Elga 2007), future selves (van Fraassen 1984). But evidence must be a modest
guide—a guide that is not sure that it is a guide. That’s. . .
The Problem: We must vindicate both our Modest and Guiding Truisms. This is a
problem of modulation: our Modest Truism allows you to leave open various possibilities
for what the rational opinions might be; our Guiding Truism requires that these various
possible rational opinions are correlated with truth. It’s a hard problem. Many have
argued that it can’t be solved—that there’s no principled center of gravity that allows
modesty but requires guidance.3 The “higher-order evidence” literature contains three
2Our Modest Truism allows rational agents to know what their credences are. Let ‘C’ be a definite
description for your actual credences. Then you may in fact be rational ([C = P ] is true) and be certain of
what your actual credences are ([C(p) = t]→ [C(C(p) = t) = 1] holds), but be unsure whether your actual
credences are rational: C(C = P ) < 1. I will suppress talk of C, since it is the rational credences P (and
so, primarily, wide-scope norms) we are interested in. Note: ‘P ’ is descriptive even when embedded
in larger constructions; ‘P (P (p) = 0.5) = 0.3’ is to be read, ‘The rational credence function (whatever
it is) assigns 0.3 credence to the claim that the rational credence function (whatever it is) assigns 0.5
credence to p.’
3Smithies (2012, 2015); Lasonen-Aarnio (2014, 2015); Titelbaum (2015); Salow (2017); Horowitz
(2018).
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responses to this challenge. Splitters accept our Modest Truism and so deny our Guiding
one—they allow your first- and higher-order opinions to split radically apart.4 Mergers
accept our Guiding Truism and so deny our Modest one—they require you to be certain
of what you should think.5 Bridgers try to find a middle way—they search for principles
weak enough to vindicate our Modest Truism but strong enough to vindicate our Guiding
one.6 Short story: Bridging is in trouble—the current proposals are all either too strong
or too weak (Lasonen-Aarnio 2014, 2015; Dorst 2018b).
The Project : Show that Bridging succeeds, after all. There is a principled center of
gravity that allows modesty while requiring guidance. We can construct an epistemology
that makes room for modest critters—like you and me—that have a rational dose of self-
doubt.
The Plan: After making the case that we should want a Bridging principle (§2), I’ll
explain why the standard one is too strong (§3) and propose a fix (§4). The rest of the
paper argues that this is the correct fix: it has the modest and guiding features we’re
after (§5), avoids the paradoxes of weaker proposals (§6), coincides with an independent
characterization of our Guiding Truism (§7), and promises fruitful applications (§8).
2 A Disagreement
I’ve offered an intuitive narrative in favor of Bridging. I’ll now offer a precise argument:
if you should take peer disagreement seriously, our Modest and Guiding Truisms must
both be true. Thus Bridging lies at the foundations of the epistemology of disagreement.
Take a paradigm case. Looking at the spoons, you and your colleague Disa know that
you share Top-related evidence, and so should have the same opinion about Top. (If this
seems implausible, stipulate that the Epistemology Oracle has announced it.) Suppose
that you start out confident of Top—and that, in fact, such confidence is warranted by
the evidence. Now you discover a disagreement: Disa is not confident of Top. Claim: this
should make you less confident of Top. More generally: if you’re rational and know that
your peer has the same relevant evidence, then your confidence should drop when you
learn that she’s less confident than you.7
4Williamson (2000, 2014); Lasonen-Aarnio (2010, 2014, 2015); Coates (2012); Hazlett (2012); Wedg-
wood (2012).
5Smithies (2012, 2015); Greco (2014a); Titelbaum (2015); Salow (2017); cf. ?.
6Feldman (2005); Gibbons (2006); Elga (2007, 2013); White (2009b); Christensen (2010a,b, 2016);
Huemer (2011); Horowitz (2014); Pettigrew and Titelbaum (2014); Vavova (2014, 2016); Littlejohn
(2015); Schoenfield (2015a,b, 2016); Sliwa and Horowitz (2015); Worsnip (2015).
7This claim presupposes only that—in such highly circumscribed cases—you should not completely
ignore your peer’s lack of confidence. Although Right Reasons theorists may object (Titelbaum 2015),
most others will agree (e.g. Christensen 2007, 2010a; Elga 2007; Feldman 2007; Roush 2009; Kelly
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First fact: this requires that you be modest. To see why, suppose you were immodest:
you were confident of Top, and were certain that you should be. Since you know that
you share Top-related evidence, you’d infer that Disa’s evidence warrants confidence
in Top. So you’d think, “Disa’s not confident of Top. But given her evidence, she
should be. Since her only route to the truth is through her evidence (it includes all facts
that determine what she should think, after all), her lack of confidence doesn’t tell me
anything about Top. So I should simply ignore her unwarranted opinion and maintain
my confidence in Top.” Thus if you were immodest, you’d ignore her opinion. Since you
shouldn’t ignore her opinion, you shouldn’t be immodest. That’s our Modest Truism.
More rigorously, let ‘PD’ and ‘CD’ be definite descriptions for the credences Disa
should have and in fact has, respectively. Your evidence warrants being sure that you and
Disa ought to have the same opinion about Top, i.e. P (P (Top) = PD(Top)) = 1. Since the
only way Disa can connect her credence with the truth of Top is through her evidence8,
once you know which opinion her evidence warrants, further learning9 her actual opinion
won’t affect the probability of Top: P (Top|PD(Top) = s) = P (Top|[PD(Top) = s] ∧ [CD(Top) = t]).
Finally, you should leave open that Disa may have a lower credence than you:
P (CD(Top) < 0.7) > 0. It follows that if you should be immodest (P (P (Top) = 0.7) = 1), then
you should ignore Disa’s lack of confidence: P (Top|CD(Top) < 0.7) = P (Top).10 Since you
shouldn’t ignore her lack of confidence, you shouldn’t be immodest.
So suppose you are modest: you are uncertain what your evidence warrants. Since
Disa is a peer, learning that she’s not confident of Top gives you reason to think that
your shared evidence doesn’t warrant confidence—despite what you initially thought.
Second fact: in order for this change to require you to lower your credence in Top,
you must be guided by the evidence. For if your opinions about your evidence didn’t
constrain your opinions about Top, then the change in higher-order opinion induced by
Disa’s disagreement needn’t lead to a change in first-order opinion.
To illustrate, consider one way our Guiding Truism could fail. Suppose your evid-
ence could warrant the following “akratic” state: being confident that Top is true, but
I shouldn’t be confident of it ; P (Top ∧ [P (Top) < 0.7]) ≥ 0.7.11 Then even if Disa’s dis-
2010; Lasonen-Aarnio 2013; Vavova 2014). Moreover, my claim is compatible with “synergistic” views
(Easwaran et al. 2016) since what you are learning is that Disa is less confident than you—not that
she has a particular credence which is slightly less.
8Titelbaum and Kopec (2017) and Levinstein (2017) give cases where your peer has non-evidential
routes to the truth, but we can stipulate that our case is one where you know this isn’t so.
9Strictly, all the principles I will discuss are about conditional beliefs, not about learning—but for
ease of exposition I’ll elide this distinction.
10P (Top|CD(Top) < 0.7) is an average of P (Top|CD(Top) = t) for the various t < 0.7. Since
P (P (Top) = 0.7) = 1, we know that each such P (Top|CD(Top) = t) = P (Top|[P (Top) = 0.7] ∧ [CD(Top) = t]) =
P (Top|[PD(Top) = 0.7] ∧ [CD(Top) = t]) = P (Top|PD(Top) = 0.7) = P (Top|P (Top) = 0.7) = P (Top).
11This is a probabilistic version of what many have called “epistemic akrasia”—the paradigm instance
being a belief in p but I shouldn’t believe it (Smithies 2012; Horowitz 2014; Titelbaum 2015). But there
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agreement made you certain that you shouldn’t be confident of Top, you should still
maintain your confidence in Top—after all, you’re confident that possibilities where you
shouldn’t be confident in Top are ones where it’s true!12 Generalizing our puzzle:
Misguided Evidence: ∃p, t : P (p ∧ [P (p) < t]) ≥ t
You should have confidence that: p but I shouldn’t have confidence that p.
If Misguided Evidence were possible, then in a parallel case (in which you start off
t-confident and then discover that Disa’s credence is lower), you needn’t lower your
credence in p. So if you must always take such disagreement seriously, Misguided Evid-
ence must be impossible. More generally, your opinions about whether your evidence
supports p must always constrain your opinions about p. That’s our Guiding Truism.
Upshot: To account for the force of peer disagreement, we must build a Bridging
theory that vindicates both our Modest and Guiding Truisms. Construction ahead.
3 A Reflection
Looking at the spoons, you should be modest: there are various epistemic states that
you should leave open might be the rational one. Here is a metaphorical (and literal)
way to conceptualize this scenario (cf. Elga 2013; Hall 1994). Imagine you are a member
of an epistemic panel: a group of candidates who share your evidence and have different
opinions in response. (Literally: a set of credence functions.) Everyone knows what
everyone else’s opinions are. (Literally: each credence function is certain of the values
of the other functions.) One of the candidates—the most diligent one—is the expert.
(Literally: one of the credence functions is the one warranted by the evidence.) You
should have an opinion iff the expert does have that opinion. (Literally: you should have
an opinion iff your evidence warrants that opinion.) But by our Modest Truism, the
expert may be unsure who the expert is—the most diligent person on the panel may not
know they’re the the most diligent person on the panel. (Literally: the credence function
warranted by the evidence may be uncertain which credence function is warranted by
the evidence.) Different candidates have different opinions about who the expert might
be: you’re sure it’s either Disa, Carl, or yourself; Carl is sure it’s either Disa or Betty,
etc. (Literally: different credence functions assign different probabilities to claims about
who the expert is.) Yet—by our Guiding Truism—all the candidates will defer when
they learn about the expert’s opinions. (Literally: each credence function will have
conditional probabilities that defer to facts about the evidence.) The question is how.
are reasons to think that akrasia is not the distinctive feature of such attitudes (Dorst 2018a).
12If P (Top ∧ [P (Top) < 0.7]) ≥ 0.7, then P (Top|P (Top) < .7) = P (Top∧[P (Top)<0.7])
P (P (Top)<.7)
≥ 0.7.
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Our story begins with the (seemingly) obvious answer. I’ll say that the expert has a
given opinion13 about p iff their credence falls in a contextually specified range: P (p) ∈
[l, h]. Obvious answer: defer to expert opinions (cf. Skyrms 1980; van Fraassen 1984;
Gaifman 1988; Christensen 2010b). That is, your opinions should be a reflection of
the expert’s: conditional on the expert being 0.6 confident of Top, be 0.6 confident of
it; conditional on the expert being between 0.5 and 0.8 confident of Top, be between
0.5 and 0.8 confident of it; and so on. Letting P (p|q) be the rational credence in p
conditional on q:
Reflection: P (p|P (p) ∈ [l, h]) ∈ [l, h]14
Upon learning that your evidence warrants a given opinion, have that opinion.
Slogan: defer to expert opinions.
Reflection says to treat the expert as a guide by simply adopting whatever opinions you
find out they have. It clearly vindicates our Guiding Truism. What could go wrong?
Modesty could. Reflection is inconsistent with our Modest Truism: it requires you to
be certain that the expert is immodest. Consider an example. Looking at the spoons,
you have two people on your panel—Imani and yourself. Imani is immodest: she’s
certain she’s the expert. You are modest: you’re 50-50 on whether you or Imani is the
expert. This simple case is inconsistent with Reflection. For conditional on the expert
being 0.5 confident that Imani’s the expert, how confident should you be that Imani’s
the expert? Reflection says to adopt the expert’s credences: be 0.5. But that’s wrong.
Imani is certain that she’s the expert. You are 0.5 confident that she is. So if the expert
(whoever it is) is 0.5 confident that Imani’s the expert, then the expert (whoever it is)
is not Imani—it’s you. Conditional on the expert being 0.5 confident that Imani’s the
expert, you should have credence 0 that she is: P (Imani|P (Imani) = 0.5) = 0. Reflection
fails.
Surprisingly, the example generalizes completely: Reflection requires you to be cer-
tain that you ought to be immodest. Letting Immodest be the proposition that the
rational credence function is certain of what the rational credence function is:
Fact 3.1. If a probability frame validates Reflection, it validates [P (Immodest) = 1].15
13Convention: technical terms to be used in the statements of principles and theorems are bolded
when defined; their definitions are collected in Appendix C.
14Look strange? Some might expect to see different probability functions on the inside and outside,
e.g. with your actual credences C deferring to the rational credences: C(p|P (p) ∈ [l, h]) ∈ [l, h]. But that
principle is false—your actual credences can be whatever you like. What’s true is that you ought to have
credences that obey this principle; letting ‘q’ mean ‘it ought to be that q’: (C(p|P (p) ∈ [l, h]) ∈ [l, h]).
But your credences ought to be the rational credences: (C(p|q) = t)⇔ [P (p|q) = t]; hence our principle.
15A probability frame is a structure for modeling the opinions—including higher-order opinions—
that a given agent should have in a given scenario. Details are in Appendix A. A probability frame
validates a principle iff the principle is true at all worlds for all well-defined instantiations of its free
variables. Samet (1997), Williamson (2000, 2014), Elga (2013), and Dorst (2018a) prove similar results.
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Upshot: although Reflection vindicates our Guiding Truism, it is incompatible with our
Modest one. A weaker principle is needed.
4 On Trust
Fact 3.1 shows that Reflection is too strong. But—in order to refine Reflection—we
need to know why it’s too strong. There are two parts to the explanation.
First: if you should be uncertain what your evidence warrants, then learning facts
about your evidence can give you new evidence—and so can change what it’s rational
to think. This is what happens in the Imani case: when you learn that the expert is 0.5
confident that Imani’s the expert, you learn that you are the expert. When the expert
(i.e. you) formed their 0.5 credence, they didn’t know that. So after learning something
about the expert’s opinions, you now have information that the expert didn’t have when
they formed those opinions. Thus you should react to this information not by adopting
the opinion they had, but rather by adopting the opinion they would have were they to
learn what you’ve learned. When you know more than the expert, you should react to
your information as you know the expert would (Elga 2013).
But when the expert learns that their opinion about p was rational, why would that
lead them to change their opinion? This is the second part of the explanation: the
expert will think that the rational credence in p is correlated with the truth-value of
p, and therefore learning that their opinions were rational can sometimes be evidence
against p. This implies that Reflection must fail.
Return to the Imani case. Letting p be the proposition that Imani’s the expert, the
expert is in fact 0.5 confident of p: P (p) = 0.5. Moreover, the expert is certain that the
expert’s credence in p (whatever it is) is either 0.5 or 1: P ([P (p) = 0.5] ∨ [P (p) = 1]) = 1.16
The expert will think that the rational credence is correlated with truth—so since there
are only two possible values of the rational credence (0.5 and 1), they will think that p
is more likely to be true if the rational credence is higher than if it’s lower:
P (p|P (p) = 0.5) < P (p|P (p) = 1)
But this implies a Reflection failure. Since the expert’s original opinion P (p) is an
average of the conditional opinions P (p|P (p) = 0.5) and P (p|P (p) = 1), it follows that
16For aficionados: this is the point at which the argument I’m about to give would fail as an argument
against (say) the Principal Principle (Lewis 1980). Since the Principal Principle connects two different
probability functions—the rational credence and chance—it can forbid the possibility that the rational
credence equals the lowest possible chance. However, principles that connect rational credence with
rational credence must allow that whenever you know what the (finite) range of possible rational
credences is, there will be a possibility where the actual rational credence is the lowest possible rational
credence—as in our case where P (p) = 0.5 while P ([P (p) = 0.5] ∨ [P (p) = 1]) = 1.
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upon learning that the rational credence in p was the lower value, the expert will drop
their credence below its original value of 0.5:
P (p|P (p) = 0.5) < P (p) = 0.5
In short: learning that the expert has a given opinion about p can sometimes be evid-
ence that the rational credence is lower than you expected it to be, and therefore—
since rational credence is correlated with truth—can be evidence against p. (Sim-
ilarly for any upper-bounded opinion P (p) ∈ [l, h]—in the Imani case learning that
the rational credence in p is between 0.5 and 0.8 would also be evidence against p:
P (p|P (p) ∈ [0.5, 0.8]) < P (p) = 0.5.)
So Reflection fails because learning that the expert has a given opinion about p can
sometimes be evidence against p. To refine it, we must find a type of information about
the rational credence in p that is never evidence against p. What could it be?
Consider the claim that the expert is at least t-confident of p: P (p) ≥ t. When this
is so, I’ll say that the expert judges that p (to the contextually specified degree t). We
could say that judgments are special cases of opinions (P (p) ∈ [l, h] where h = 1). Or
we could say that opinions are conjunctions of judgments.17 However we carve it up,
judgments are important. Why?
Because the claim that the rational credence in p is at least t can only provide
evidence that the rational credence is higher than you originally thought, and so—since
rational credence is correlated with truth—can never be evidence against p.
More precisely, suppose—for reductio—that learning that the expert judges p provides
evidence against p:
P (p|P (p) ≥ t) < P (p)
From this it follows (by total probability) that learning that the rational credence is
at least t should lead you to lower your credence in p, while learning that the rational
credence is less than t should lead you to raise your credence in p:
P (p|P (p) ≥ t) < P (p) < P (p|P (p) < t)
In other words, you should think that possibilities where the rational credence in p
is higher are less likely to be ones where p is true—you should think that the rational
credence is not correlated with truth! But that’s wrong. Contraposing: since you should
think that rational credence is correlated with truth, learning that the rational credence
in p is above a given threshold can never provide evidence against p. Precisely:
P (p|P (p) ≥ t) ≥ P (p)
17Since P (p) = 1− P (¬p), an [l, h]-opinion that p is equivalent to the conjunction of an l-judgment
that p and a (1−h)-judgment that ¬p: P (p) ∈ [l, h] ⇔ ([P (p) ≥ l] ∧ [P (¬p) ≥ 1−h]).
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This is the crux of our story, for it shows us how to refine Reflection.18 Suppose you
learn that the expert judges that p: P (p) ≥ t. You should react to this information as
you know the expert would—so how would the expert react? You’ve learned that they
were originally at least t-confident of p. By the above reasoning, if they were to learn
what you learned (namely, that the expert judges that p) this wouldn’t provide them
with any evidence against p—their credence wouldn’t drop. Since you know that they
were originally at least t-confident of p, you can infer that upon learning what you’ve
learned the expert would react by still being at least t-confident of p. You should react
to your information as you know the expert would. So you should be at least t-confident
of p. Precisely:
Simple Trust: P (p|P (p) ≥ t) ≥ t
Upon learning that your evidence warrants judging that p, judge that p.
Slogan: take expert judgments on trust.
Simple Trust is what we get when we restrict Reflection to apply to expert opinions of
the form [t, 1]—opinions that are never evidence against p.
Summing up: For evidence to be a modest guide, rational credence must be correl-
ated with truth. This means two things. First, it means that learning that the expert’s
credence in p falls within a range can be evidence against p. That is why Reflection fails.
Second, it means that learning that the expert’s credence in p falls above a threshold
can never be evidence against p. That’s why Simple Trust holds. The rest of the paper
defends this solution.
Or rather: a solution like Simple Trust. We need one final piece of bookkeeping—one
that applies equally to Reflection. No matter what bit of information q you learn, you
should still treat your evidence (updated on q) as a guide. Thus our deference principles
should apply not only to the unconditional attitudes warranted by the evidence, but
also the conditional ones. Let Pq(p) be the credence (whatever it is) that your evidence
warrants having in p conditional on q. Our deference principles should apply with ‘Pq’
substituted for ‘P ’. Of course, doing so yields our original principles as a special case
(let q = p ∨ ¬p); so since Reflection is already too strong, so too is its generalization.
But for principles that are not too strong—like Simple Trust—this generalization is
exactly what we need. Thus we arrive at the promised principle:
Trust: Pq(p|Pq(p) ≥ t) ≥ t
Upon learning that your evidence warrants reacting to q by judging that p, react
to q by judging that p.
Slogan: take expert judgments on trust.
18The following line of reasoning is formalized in §5.
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I claim that Trust is the key to making evidence a modest guide. But I won’t ask you
to take it on trust—the rest of this paper makes the case.
4.1 Trust me
Trust isn’t just a solution—it’s a natural, intuitive one. That may look doubtful. But
I wouldn’t waste your time (or mine) with a gerrymandered formal principle. Right off
the bat, there are four things you need to know.
One: Trust is symmetric. Say that a principle holds at a world w iff all of its
instances (well-defined instantiations of free variables) are true at w. Then:
Fact 4.1. In any probability frame: Trust holds at a world iff Pq(p|Pq(p) ≤ t) ≤ t does.
Upon learning that the expert judges that p (P (p) ≥ t), you should judge that p; and
upon learning that the expert doesn’t judge that p (P (p) ≤ t), you shouldn’t judge that p.
Uh oh. Does this imply Reflection? I say that (Trust:) upon learning that the
expert is at least 0.7 confident, be at least 0.7; and upon learning that they’re at most
0.8 confident, be at most 0.8. Does it follow that (Reflection:) upon learning that the
expert is at least 0.7 and at most 0.8 confident, you should be at least 0.7 and at most
0.8? No.
Two: Trust does not imply Reflection.
Fact 4.2. There are probability frames that validate Trust in which Reflection fails at
all worlds.
This is possible because probabilistic support is non-monotonic: learning one thing can
push your credence above 0.7, even if further learning would pull it lower. And it is
actual because of the crux of our story: an expert judgment is never evidence against p,
while an expert opinion sometimes is. Example: recall Immodest Imani, who is certain
that Imani’s the expert (I). If you learn that the expert judges that Imani’s the expert
to degree 0.7 (P (I) ≥ 0.7), you should raise your credence to at least 0.7—for you know
the expert would react to this information by doing so. But if you further learn that the
expert both judges that Imani’s the expert to degree 0.7 and does not judge that she
is to degree 0.8 ([P (I) ≥ 0.7] ∧ [P (I) < 0.8]), you should drop your credence to 0 —for you
know that Imani does judge that she’s the expert to degree 0.8. In short, Trust works
because—and only because—it applies to judgments. It does not imply Reflection.
Three: Trust implies special cases of Reflection. Suppose you should be certain that
the expert’s opinion is in a given range: P (P (p) ∈ [l, h]) = 1. Then—since updating on
these bounds doesn’t provide any new information—Trust constrains your unconditional
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credences to be in that range.19 More generally, when you should be sure that if the
evidence warrants a given opinion, then it warrants certainty that it does so, you should
obey Reflection. Letting Sp (=df P (p) = 1) mean that your evidence warrants being
Sure of p:
Fact 4.3. In any probability frame, if Trust holds, and for a given l, h ∈ [0, 1] it’s true
that P (S(P (p) ∈ [l, h])
∣∣P (p) ∈ [l, h]) = 1, then P (p|P (p) ∈ [l, h]) ∈ [l, h].
Four: paraphrased into natural language, Trust is truistic. That may seem doubt-
ful, for Trust governs only judgments—and even if they are theoretically important,
judgments may seem a contrivance.




∣∣∣ confident of Top, about it being ∣∣∣ reallypretty
somewhat
∣∣∣ likely to be true, about∣∣∣ leaving opensuspecting
thinking
∣∣∣ that it’s true, and so on. All of these terms share an important logical
feature: they are preserved under increases in probability. If you are sorta confident of
Top and then you become more confident, you are still sorta confident of it (though you
may now also be very confident); if it’s somewhat likely to be true and then becomes
more likely, it is still somewhat likely to be true (though it may now also be really likely);
if you leave open that it’s true and then you become more confident, you still leave open
that it’s true (though you may now also think that it is).20 It follows that these terms
cannot denote (proper) opinions, for such opinions are bounded above and below—if
you have a middling opinion that Top, then increasing your confidence can lead you
to lose it. Instead, these terms must denote judgments. Combining this observation
with the fact that natural language expresses conditional probabilities as probabilities
of (indicative) conditionals (cf. Stalnaker 1970; Adams 1975; Edgington 1995), we see
that Trust is really just a set of truisms:
You should think it
∣∣∣ reallypretty
somewhat
∣∣∣ likely that if the evidence makes it ∣∣∣ reallypretty
somewhat
∣∣∣ likely




∣∣∣ confident that if the evidence warrants being ∣∣∣ veryfairly
sorta
∣∣∣ confid-




∣∣∣ that if the evidence warrants ∣∣∣ thinkingsuspecting
leaving open
∣∣∣ that p, then p.
And if Lockeans are right that belief reduces to sufficiently high credence (Foley 1992,
2009; Sturgeon 2008; Leitgeb 2013; Dorst 2017):
19Precisely, l ≤ P (p|P (p) ≥ l) = P (p) = P (p|P (p) ≤ h) ≤ h. This is a synchronic version of a “con-
glomerability” constraint (Easwaran 2013). The generalization of Trust in §7 implies a more standard
diachronic version: the current rational credence is bounded by the possible future rational credences.
20Saying “It’s rather likely to rain” suggests that it’s not very likely to. But this is a pragmatic
phenomenon—compare: “Jane is rather tall” implicates (but does not entail) that she’s not very tall.
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You should believe that if the evidence warrants believing that p, then p.
Upshot: Trust is an elegant, well-motivated weakening of Reflection.
4.2 Trust Trust
The progression of this paper suggests two hypotheses. The first:
Trust vindicates our Modest and Guiding Truisms.
I claim that I can establish this first hypothesis—that Bridging succeeds, after all. In
fact, this success is so resounding that it suggests that Splitters and Mergers should jump
ship. Precisely, say that you are higher-order coherent iff there is a body of evidence
that would make your first- and higher-order opinions rational. The second hypothesis:
You are higher-order coherent iff you obey Trust.
The rest of this paper defends these two hypotheses. §5 shows that Trust both vindicates
our Modest Truism and has many guiding features. However, it also has commitments—
most notably, the positive access principle that if you should be sure of p, you should
be sure that you should be. In light of this, some may seek a weaker principle. §6
replies that we need a strong principle like Trust to avoid paradoxical results. §7 goes
further: an independent characterization of the Guiding Truism leads exactly to Trust.
§8 closes with applications.
It is the results in §5 and §7 that establish the first hypothesis. And it is the entire
story—from the necessity of Bridging, to the failures of alternatives, to the successes of
Trust—that composes the argument for the second.
5 Of Trust
In this section we’ll see the virtues of Trust: it allows you to be extremely modest, while
still requiring that you treat your evidence as a guide. Here’s what you need to know.
On the modesty side: Trust allows you to be certain that the expert is modest, as well
as to be virtually indifferent over which of an arbitrary set of opinions is rational. On
the guiding side: Trust requires you to react to new information as you know the expert
would; it requires that you think the expert’s judgment is correlated with truth; it rules
out our puzzling case of Misguided Evidence; and it requires that the more higher-order
doubts you have, the more moderate your first-order opinions must be. This is all
exactly what we want. But Trust also has controversial commitments: it implies the
surely-factivity principle that you should be sure that your evidence only warrants being
certain of p if p is true; and it implies the positive access principle that if you should be
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sure of p, you should be sure that you should be sure of p. We might worry about these
commitments—but §§6–7 argue that we need them. For those mainly interested in the
big picture, the rest of §5 can be skipped. For those interested in the details, follow me
into the weeds.
Modesty first. Trust isn’t just formally weaker than Reflection—it’s substantively
weaker. First, Trust allows (but does not require!) you to be certain that your evidence
warrants modesty. Letting modest be the proposition that you should be uncertain what
the rational credence function is:
Fact 5.1. There are probability frames that validate both Trust and [P (modest) = 1].
Of course, Fact 5.1 doesn’t tell us how modest Trust allows you to be. But it turns out
that Trust allows you to be extremely modest—you can be virtually indifferent as to
which of an arbitrary set of opinions is rational:
Fact 5.2. For any T = {t1, ..., tn} ⊂ [0, 1], there are probability frames that validate
Trust with a candidate21 pi and proposition p such that pi(P (p) ∈ T ) ≈ 1 and for all ti:
pi(P (p) = ti) ≈ 1n .
Upshot: our diagnosis of Reflection was correct. The reason it ruled out modesty was
because it failed to distinguish facts about evidential support that can and cannot be
evidence against p. Trust is built upon this distinction—and as a result, it vindicates
our Modest Truism.
What about our Guiding Truism? There are two separable components to being
properly guided. Start with a metaphor. If you’re going on a hike, you need two things—
a guidebook and a compass. The guidebook has no information about your immediate
surroundings. It’s useful because it has a wealth of conditional information—“If you’re
on the path facing east, the road is to your left”, and so on. The guidebook is valuable
as a map—once you enrich it with your local knowledge, it gives fine-grained directions;
it is an optimal handler of new information. In contrast, the compass can’t give you
fine-grained directions. Its purpose is simply to orient you toward something you care
about—in this case, north. The compass is valuable as a tracker ; it is a reliable indicator
of north. Having a map but no tracker is liable to lead you astray—if you’re turned
around, the map will send you in exactly the wrong direction. Having a tracker but no
map is liable to leave you in the dark—if you don’t know the area, you’ll walk right past
your campsite. To be properly guided, you need both a map and a tracker.
End of metaphor. For your evidence to be a guide, it must have the features of both
a map and a tracker. More precisely, it must be both (1) an optimal handler of new
information and (2) a reliable indicator of the truth.
21Unlike ‘P ’, ‘pi’ is a rigid designator for a probability function whose values are known. pi is a
candidate in a probability frame iff at some world you should leave open that pi is the rational
credence function.
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(1) First, an optimal handler of new information—a map. When the expert knows
everything you know, you should defer to their opinions. This doesn’t require Reflection—
for when you learn about the expert’s opinion you may know something that they don’t.
(Looking at your surroundings, you may know more than your map does.) Rather, what
it requires is that whenever you get new information, you should react to it as you know
the expert would. Imagine the following scenario. Sitting on the panel, everyone hears
an announcement that q. (q could tell you anything—e.g. that Bill is not the expert.)
After q is announced, the remaining panelists—the ones who still might be the expert—
announce their new opinions in Top. How, then, should you react to q? Slogan: react as
you know the expert would. If all remaining panelists react with opinions about Top in
a given range, then you should have that opinion in that range. Precisely22:
Reaction: If Pq
(
Pq(p) ∈ [l, h]
)
= 1, then Pq(p) ∈ [l, h]
If you should be sure that your evidence warrants reacting to your information q
with a given opinion, react with that opinion.
Slogan: react as you know the expert would.
Reaction encodes an important component of treating your evidence as a guide, for
it guarantees that your opinions are constrained by your opinions about the expert’s
opinions. But—as will become clear in §6—just like a map without a compass, Reaction
by itself would allow your evidence to send you in exactly the wrong direction.
(2) So evidence must also be a tracker—the expert’s best guesses should be a reliable
indicator of the truth. (The pointer on the compass should be a reliable indicator of
north.) Imagine the following scenario. Everyone on your panel is asked whether or not
they judge that Top (i.e. whether or not their credence is above a salient threshold).
You are then going to find out what the expert did: you’ll see a green light if the expert
guessed that Top, a red light otherwise. You have some prior opinion about Top. Then
you see a green light—how should your opinion change? You now know that the expert
judged that Top is true. If expert judgments track the truth—if their confidence in
Top is correlated with its truth value—this is evidence in favor of Top. So you shouldn’t
decrease your confidence in Top. Precisely, and generalizing to conditional judgments:
Reliance: Pq(p|Pq(p) ≥ t) ≥ Pq(p)
Upon learning that your evidence warrants reacting to your information q by
judging that p, you shouldn’t decrease your confidence in p.
Slogan: take experts to be reliable.
22Reaction is inspired by Elga’s (2013) “New Reflection” principle (cf. Hall 1994), but Reaction is
stronger. Moreover—unlike New Reflection (cf. Pettigrew and Titelbaum 2014)—Reaction is preserved
under conditioning.
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We have two components to being a guide: being an optimal responder to new inform-
ation (a map) and being a reliable indicator of the truth (a tracker). Trust vindicates
both. In fact, Trust vindicates exactly both:
Fact 5.3. A probability frame validates Trust iff it validates both Reaction and Reliance.
This is the formalization of the intuitive argument from §4: if we require that you react to
new information as you know the expert would and that expert credences are correlated
with truth, then Trust is precisely what we get. Upshot: Trust yields the general guiding
features—of a map and a tracker—that we’re after.
It also yields specific ones. First, Trust rules out our paradigm cases of a mismatch
between first- and higher-order opinions. Recall Misguided Evidence: putative cases
in which it’s rational to have confidence that p but I shouldn’t have confidence that p
(∃p, t : P (p ∧ [P (p) < t]) ≥ t). Trust prevents this:
Fact 5.4. If Trust holds at a world in a probability frame, Misguided Evidence does not.
Finally, Trust forces a robust bridge between your first- and higher-order attitudes:
Fact 5.5. In any probability frame: if Trust holds then [P (P (p) ≥ t) ≥ s]→ [P (p) ≥ t·s]
does too. No stronger connection holds: for any t, s ∈ [0, 1]: there are probability frames
that validate Trust and make both [P (P (p) ≥ t) ≥ s] and [P (p) = t·s] true at a world.
Fact 5.5 implies that if you’re confident that you should be confident of something, you
should be at least somewhat confident of it. Example: if you should be at least 0.9
confident that you should be at least 0.9 confident of Top, then you should be at least
0.81 confident of Top. Conversely, if you should have significant higher-order doubts,
your first-order opinion must be moderate. Example: if you should be at least 0.4
confident that you should be at least 0.6 confident (P (P (p) ≥ 0.6) ≥ 0.4) but also at
least 0.4 confident that you should be at most 0.4 confident (P (P (p) ≤ 0.4) ≥ 0.4), then
your opinion in p must be between 0.24 and 0.76. More generally, if you are to have an
opinionated credence in p, you can’t have many higher-order doubts. For instance, if
your credence in p should be 0.1 (P (p) = 0.1), then: the maximal credence you can have
that you should be at least 0.2 confident (max[P (P (p) ≥ 0.2)]) is 12 ; the maximal credence
you can have that you should be at least 0.3 confident is 13 ; . . . and the maximal credence
you can have that you should be at least 0.9 confident is 19 . In contrast: if you have a
moderate credence in p, your higher-order doubts can range much wider. For instance,
if your credence in p should be 0.5 (P (p) = 0.5), then: the maximal credence you can
have that your credence in p should be at least 0.6 is 56 ; the maximal credence you can
have that your credence in p should be at least 0.7 is 57 ; ...and the maximal credence
you can have that you credence in p should be at least 0.9 is 59 . Using Fact 5.5, these
relationships are graphed for various values of P (p) in Figure 1 below.23
23The graphs do not plot what your higher-order opinions must be, given your first-order ones—they
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Figure 1: Possible higher-order doubts, given first-order credence.
So we know a lot about Trust. How? The key to many of the results stated in this
section is that we can give an exact characterization of Trust within a natural class
of models (Theorem 5.7, Appendix A.1).24 The upshot is that Trust imposes three
substantive—but tenable—constraints on the structure of evidence.
The first constraint is surely-factivity. You should be sure that: you should be sure
represent how Trust constrains the relation between the two. Note: the maxima are not always jointly
satisfiable: if P (p) = 0.1 you (obviously) cannot have both P (P (p) ≥ 0.1) = 1 and P (P (p) ≤ 0) = 0.9.
24Those models are prior frames—a subclass of probability frames in which uncertainty about what
you should think flows from uncertainty about what you should be sure of (i.e. condition on).
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of p only if p is true. Recalling that Sp is the proposition that your evidence warrants
being Sure of p: S(Sp→ p). In other words, you should never say to yourself, “Maybe I
should be certain of p even though it’s false” (i.e. P (Sp ∧ ¬p) > 0). (For if you did, then
upon learning that your evidence warrants certainty of p, you’d still be less than certain
of it—you wouldn’t trust your evidence.) Surely-factivity makes full-blown factivity
(i.e. Sp→ p) natural, though not inevitable.
The second constraint is positive access. You should be sure of p only if you should
be sure that you should be: Sp → SSp.25 In other words, you should never say to
yourself, “p is true, but maybe I shouldn’t be sure of it.” (i.e. Sp ∧ [P (¬Sp) > 0]). (For if
you did, then upon learning that your evidence warrants being unsure of p, you’d still
be sure of it—you wouldn’t trust your evidence.)
Surely-factivity and positive access are the only non-probabilistic constraints that
Trust imposes in full generality. But under the auxiliary assumption that your higher-
order uncertainty comes from uncertainty about what you should be sure of, Trust is
closely related to a third constraint. It is implied by (and almost implies) the constraint
that we can define an indicative conditional operator ‘’ that interacts sensibly with
your conditional beliefs: in particular, (a) if you are certain of p conditional on q, then
you are certain of if q then p; and (b) for consistent q, if you are certain that if q then p
then you are not certain that if q then ¬p. (See Appendix A.1 for details.)
Here is where we are. Trust is the culmination of our search for a modest guide: it is
a well-motivated refinement of Reflection, it allows plenty of modesty, it captures both
the map and tracker aspects of being a guide, it rules out our puzzle cases, and it forces
a sensible connection between your first- and higher-order attitudes. In short, we have
reason to think that Trust is the Goldilocks principle.
But not conclusive reason. Trust imposes controversial constraints on the structure
of evidence—most notably, positive access. Many will want to reject this principle—and
will therefore be worried about Trust. Bridgers may try to endorse a weaker principle
(cf. Elga 2013; Sliwa and Horowitz 2015; Christensen 2016), while Splitters may reject
the search for such principles altogether (cf. Lasonen-Aarnio 2015; Williamson 2018).
What of such alternative approaches—might they succeed? No.
6 In Judgment
This section argues that without a strong principle like Trust, paradox ensues. Though
the argument is forceful, it is blunt—it cannot pinpoint Trust as the only solution. But a
25Trust does not require negative access, which says that if you shouldn’t be sure of p, you should
be sure that you shouldn’t be: ¬Sp→ S¬Sp. Unlike its positive counterpart, negative access rules out
modesty (within prior frames) and is untenable for factive attitudes like knowledge (Stalnaker 2006).
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follow-up argument can: §7 proposes a characterization of our Guiding Truism in terms
of the value of evidence (Good 1967), and then shows that it leads exactly to Trust.
Why won’t a weaker principle do? Because there is another puzzle—one which, if
allowed, would undermine the normative role of evidence. Consider:
Sycophants
Looking at the spoons, Sybil and Phan should be sure that one of them—
the diligent one—has the credences warranted by their (shared) evidence.
Conditional on it being either one of them, they agree on everything. But
unconditionally they disagree: Sybil is 0.9 confident that Phan is the diligent
one; Phan is 0.9 confident that Sybil is.
They are falling over themselves to give each other credit:
Sybil: ‘You’re probably more diligent than me.’
Phan: ‘No, you’re probably more diligent than me.’
Sybil: ‘No, you’re probably more diligent than me.’
Phan: ‘No!’ [. . . ]
Schematically, the scenario looks like this. There are two relevant possibilities: that
Sybil is the diligent one (s) and that Phan is (p). What they should think depends on
which of these possibilities they’re in. If Sybil is the diligent one, they should be 0.9
confident that Phan is the diligent one and (so) 0.1 confident that Sybil is. If Phan is
the diligent one, they should be 0.9 confident that Sybil is the diligent one and (so) 0.1
confident that Phan is. Letting an arrow labeled t from x to y mean that at possibility






We shouldn’t allow Sycophants. For doing so would thereby allow you to be certain
that your evidence is an anti-guide—that the expert has made an error in judgment.
p is the proposition that Phan is the diligent one. If p is true, then their evidence
warrants judging—as Phan does—that that p is false: P (¬p) ≥ 0.9. And if p is false,
then their evidence warrants judging—as Sybil does—that p is true: P (p) ≥ 0.9. Either
way, their evidence warrants making the wrong judgment about p: at both possibilities
the biconditionals p ↔ [P (¬p) ≥ 0.9] and ¬p ↔ [P (p) ≥ 0.9] are true. Since Sybil
and Phan should be sure that one of these possibilities is actual, they should be sure
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of these biconditionals. Thus they should be sure that Phan is the diligent one iff we
should judge that he’s not, and that Phan is not the diligent one iff we should judge that
he is: S(p↔ [P (¬p) ≥ 0.9]) and S(¬p↔ [P (p) ≥ 0.9]). Generalizing, the puzzle is that you
should be sure that the rational credence in p is anti-correlated with the truth:
Effacing Evidence: ∃p, t : S(p↔ [P (p) < t]) and S(¬p↔ [P (p) > t]).
You should be sure that p is true iff you should not have confidence in it, and that
p is false iff you should have confidence in it.
I claim that any theory that allows Effacing Evidence is too weak.
First, intuitively. Suppose we are trying to figure out what Phan thinks:
Phan: ‘I’ve judged that Sybil is the diligent one.’
Us: ‘What does she think?’
Phan: ‘She’s judged that I’m the diligent one. So I probably ought to judge that I am.’
Us: ‘Well, why don’t you?
Phan: ‘I said I probably ought to judge that I’m the diligent one—not that doing so
would probably be correct. It would most likely be incorrect.’
Us: ‘But why do you think that it would most likely be incorrect? Is that what your
evidence suggests?’
Phan: ‘To the contrary. My evidence probably suggests that I’m the diligent one. That’s
why I think that Sybil is.’
Us: ‘Wait—you’re not listening to your evidence?’
Phan: ‘I sure hope not! My evidence is wrong about who the diligent one is.’
Us: ‘So why conform to your evidence?’
Phan: ‘Exactly. Of course, I ought to—my evidence determines what I should think,
after all. But it’s a bad idea this time around. That’s why I’m trying to avoid it.’
Us: ‘No: why ought you conform to your evidence, if you know it’ll lead you astray?’
Phan: ‘. . . I just ought to! My evidence tells me what I ought to think. Sometimes I
know that what it tells me to think is false. But what am I to do? Life is hard.’
Something has gone wrong. A theory of rationality can’t be made of just any arbitrary
list of requirements—it must have the right structural features. In particular, the theory
must be able to answer the question: ‘Why conform to my evidence?’ (Horowitz 2013;
Schoenfield 2015b). No theory that allows Effacing Evidence can do so. For—as Phan’s
thoughts reveal—such theories sometimes allow you to know that your evidence is an
anti-guide to what you actually value.
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We can make this precise in two ways. Suppose you have Effacing Evidence with
t = 12 : you should be sure that p is true iff you should be less than
1
2 confident of it, and
that p is false iff you should be more than 12 confident of it. (The arguments generalize.)
First, you can be certain that choosing rationally will lead you to lose money. For I
can offer you the following three options:
Bet 1: win $1 if p, lose $1 if ¬p
Bet 2: win $1 if ¬p, lose $1 if p
No Bet: $0
It’s rational (maximizes expected utility) to take Bet 1 iff you should be more than 12
confident of p. It’s rational to take Bet 2 iff you should be less than 12 confident of p.
But you should be certain that you should be more than 12 confident of p (should take
Bet 1) iff ¬p—i.e. iff you will lose that bet. And you should be certain that you should
be less than 12 confident of p (should take Bet 2) iff p—i.e. iff you will lose that bet. So
you should be certain that acting rationally—taking the option you ought to take—will
lead you to lose $1 and be poorer than if you took No Bet! Upshot: theories that allow
Effacing Evidence allow rational requirements to lead to a sure loss.26
Second, you can be certain that being rational will lead you to lose accuracy. For
one of your doxastic options is to have credence 12 in p, come what may. Yet you
should be certain that it’s rational to have credence below 12 in p iff p is true, and that
it’s rational to have credence above 12 in p iff p is false. That is, being rational will
either lead you to have less confidence in a truth or more confidence in a falsehood
than simply having credence 12 . So you should be certain that believing rationally—
having the credence you ought to have—will lead you to be less accurate than having
credence 12 . Upshot: theories that allow Effacing Evidence allow rational requirements
to be accuracy-dominated by another available option.27
In short, theories that allow Effacing Evidence allow you to be certain that being
rational—in and of itself—will prevent you from getting the things you actually value,
like money and accuracy. They cannot vindicate our Guiding Truism.
But wait—is it really so surprising that sometimes you can know that being rational
will make you worse off? Suppose I credibly threaten to drain your bank account iff
your credences are rational. You then can be certain that being rational will prevent
you from keeping the things you actually value (like money), right?
Right. But in this case there is a cost to being rational: doing so puts you in a bad
situation where—no matter what else you do—you will be left with less money. Not so
26Many take it as a premise that rational requirements can do no such thing—most notably, Dutch
Bookies (cf. Ramsey 2010; Skyrms 1966; Christensen 1991).
27Many take it as a premise that rational requirements can do no such thing—most notably, epistemic
utility theorists (e.g. Joyce 1998, 2009; Pettigrew 2013, 2016).
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in my argument against Sycophants. In that argument there is was absolutely no cost
to being rational: all the same options have all the same values, regardless of whether
you are rational or not. (If you are rational, it is still true that were you to take No Bet,
you wouldn’t lose any money.) The only reason you can be certain that being rational
will lead you to lose money is that you can be certain that being rational will lead you
to choose the worst available option. The difference is crucial. All theories need to
allow that sometimes you can know that being rational will lead you to be hurt. But
no theory should allow that sometimes you can know that being rational will lead you
to hurt yourself.
But wait—couldn’t you have Effacing Evidence? Suppose God sets things up so that
the rational opinions are inaccurate about p—and then she announces as much. Can
you now be sure that being rational will lead you to have inaccurate opinions about p?
No. Distinguish two versions of the case.
First version: God sets things up so that you are rational to be confident of p iff p
is false: [P (p) ≥ 0.7] ↔ ¬p. Then she announces this fact, so you update your beliefs
on the claim that [P (p) ≥ 0.7] ↔ ¬p. Do you now have Effacing Evidence? No. For
what you’ve learned was that before God told you anything, the rational credence in p
pointing in the wrong direction. This does not imply that after being told this, the
updated rational credence is still pointing in the wrong direction. Formally, letting
q =df ([P (p) ≥ 0.7]↔ ¬p), it is true that Pq([P (p) ≥ 0.7]↔ ¬p) = 1 but it does not follow
(and is not plausible) that Pq([Pq(p) ≥ 0.7]↔ ¬p) = 1, as required for Effacing Evidence.
Second version: God offers the self-referential announcement, “The rational reaction
to this very announcement is to be certain that: the rational credence in p is high iff p is
false.” In response to this announcement, do you have Effacing Evidence? No. For note
that a parallel objection can be given against virtually any other rational norm—God
could just as well announce: “The rational reaction to this very announcement is to be
certain of p∧¬p.” Since this “counterexample” to the norm not to believe contradictions
is not compelling, neither is the “counterexample” to a ban on Effacing Evidence.
I conclude, then, that we should reject theories that permit Effacing Evidence. What
theories do so? Many. I cannot go into the details here, so a summary will have to do.
First, the Sycophants model validates positive access (Sp → SSp), negative access
(¬Sp → S¬Sp), and factivity (Sp → p), so traditional versions of access internalism
cannot rule it out (e.g. Smithies 2012). Second, since Sybil and Phan agree on everything
upon learning which one of them is rational, the Sycophants model validates Reaction.28
Finally, evidential versions of calibrationism (Sliwa and Horowitz 2015; Christensen
2016) can generate cases of Effacing Evidence, as can natural versions of Williamson’s
(2014) unmarked clock model (see Dorst 2018b). If I am right, no such theory can be
28Hence it also validates Elga’s (2013) New Reflection principle, mentioned in footnote 22.
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correct. Instead, we need a principle strong enough to rule out Effacing Evidence. Trust
fits the bill:
Fact 6.1. If Trust holds at a world in a probability frame, Effacing Evidence does not.
Upshot: despite its controversial consequences, we need a strong theory like Trust.
But how can we be sure that we’ve got that theory just right? What if Trust is too
weak—permitting as-yet-unnamed puzzles? Or what if Trust is too strong—ruling out
more than is required to solve them? I’m now going to offer a proof —of sorts—that it’s
not. No stronger theory is needed, and no weaker theory will do.
7 Of Value
What we need is an explication of our Guiding Truism that comes out true. I’m going
to defend a proposal for the minimal such explication—the weakest principle that fully
captures our Guiding Truism—and then show that it leads exactly to Trust. Thus
Trust vindicates an explication—no stronger theory is needed. And Trust vindicates
the minimal explication—no weaker theory will do.
The idea is this. Why should we care about gathering and conforming to evidence?
What makes evidence something of value? I.J. Good (1967) gave a famous answer: evid-
ence helps us make good choices. Suppose you face a decision problem—a set of options
that may lead to different outcomes to which you assign different values. A body of
evidence is valuable iff—supposing the evidence is free—the expected value of taking
the option warranted by the evidence (whatever it is) is higher than the expected value
of any other particular option. (Loosely: iff you should prefer to use free evidence to
make your decision, rather than ignore it.) Example: you have to decide whether to
take a bet on Top. You could either (1) scrutinize the spoons more closely (obtain more
evidence) or (2) simply decide now whether to take the bet (ignore that evidence). No
doubt the expected value of (1) is higher than that of (2)—the evidence is valuable.
Good generalized that idea. He argued that—no matter what options and values you
have—evidence is always valuable. In formulating this idea, many have have treated it
diachronically: you should prefer to gather and use a more informed body of evidence
to make your decision (cf. Skyrms 1990; Oddie 1997; Myrvold 2012; Huttegger 2014;
Ahmed and Salow 2018). But once we allow modesty—uncertainty about your current
evidence—there are in fact two instances of Good’s idea. In making your decision, you
should prefer: (1) to use your current evidence (whatever it is), rather than simply
choose an option; and (2) to use a more informed body of evidence (whatever it is),
rather than simply choose an option.
We can capture both instances under one schema. Say that a body of evidence is
at least as informed as yours (for short: informed) iff it contains all your evidence,
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and maybe more. So (trivially) your evidence is at least as informed as your evidence,
and (nontrivially) the evidence you’d have after scrutinizing the spoons is at least as
informed as your evidence. Generalizing Good’s idea (formalized in Appendix A.2):
Value
You should always expect the option warranted by informed evidence to be at
least as good as you should expect any other particular option to be.
Slogan: evidence is valuable.
Example: I offer you a bet on Top—you must decide whether to take it or leave it. If
you were 0.8 confident of Top, you’d take it; if you were 0.6 confident of Top, you’d
leave it. Being 0.7, you’re on the fence—the expected value of taking it and of leaving
it are balanced. What about the expected value of doing what you should do (what the
expert would do)—whatever that is? If you should be 0.8 (as perhaps you should), what
you should do is take it; if you should be 0.6 (as perhaps you should), what you should
do is leave it. Being unsure what you should think, you’re unsure what you should do.
But why care about doing what you should do? Why treat your evidence as a guide?
Value says: because you should expect it to help you make good decisions.
Value applies to any informed body of evidence—not just you own. Following suit,
we can generalize our principles; for example, our Guiding Truism:
Informed Guiding Truism
Your evidence always warrants being disposed to treat informed evidence as a
guide.
Similarly for our deference principles. Let i and k be two (perhaps identical) bodies of
evidence—subject to the constraint that k is at least as informed as i (k ≥ i). Let P i be
the credences that are rational given evidence i (whatever they are), and P k be those
that are rational given evidence k. Then Trust (and its ilk) should be generalized:
Informed Trust: P iq(p|P kq (p) ≥ t) ≥ t (k ≥ i)
Upon learning that informed evidence warrants reacting to q by judging that p,
react to q by judging that p.
Slogan: take informed expert judgments on trust.
Having generalized our search for a modest guide, I’ll now argue that Value is the
minimal explication of the (Informed) Guiding Truism—it fully vindicates that truism;
and no weaker principle would.
As with the argument against Effacing Evidence in §6, it is crucial to note that Value
applies to being rational in and of itself. Three clarifications. (1) Value applies to the
expected value of freely taking the option warranted by an informed body of evidence;
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thus it screens off any costs—monetary, psychological, computational, and so on—that
using that evidence may have. (If you will be punished for using your evidence, doing
so might not maximize expected value.) (2) Value applies to the expected value of
successfully taking the option warranted by an informed body evidence; thus it screens
off any risks of misusing the evidence that obtaining it may bring. (If trying to use
the evidence will likely lead to mistakes, doing so might not maximize expected value.)
(3) Value applies to the expected value of simply taking the option warranted by an
informed body of evidence; thus it screens off any effects on you—such as changes in
values—that obtaining that evidence may have. (If using the evidence will change your
outlook on life (Paul 2014), doing so might not maximize expected value.) Although
such costs, risks, and effects are ever-present in real life, Value explains why—when they
become sufficiently small—you should always prefer to use the evidence.
Suitably clarified, Value is plausible. It is also applicable—it explains what’s puzzling
about our puzzles:
Fact 7.1. In any dynamic probability frame: if Misguided Evidence or Effacing Evidence
are true at a world, Value fails.
This is because Value rules out the possibility that evidence could be an “anti-guide,”
and thus subsumes the argument against Effacing Evidence in §6. (A similar argument
can be given against Misguided Evidence.)
Finally, here is a general argument that Value is the minimal explication of the
(Informed) Guiding Truism—the claim that you should always be disposed to treat
informed evidence as a guide. There is no doubt that it is an explication. For suppose
that Value holds. Then no matter what decision problem you’re facing—whether it’s
what to do, or what to think—then if you could do what’s warranted by an informed
body of evidence, then you should. (Doing so would maximize expected value). Thus
there’s a perfectly good sense in which you should always treat informed evidence as
a guide—our Guiding Truism comes out true. Conversely, no principle weaker than
Value would vindicate our Guiding Truism. For suppose that Value fails: there is a
decision problem in which you expect that doing what’s warranted by an informed body
of evidence will lead to a worse outcome than ignoring that evidence. So if you were
given a choice between the two, you should prefer to ignore the evidence—for you should
expect the expert (the person following the evidence) to make a worse choice than you!
Thus there’s no perfectly good sense in which you should always treat informed evidence
as a guide—our Guiding Truism comes out false.
Suppose that this is right: we vindicate our Guiding Truism iff we vindicate Value.
What does it take to vindicate Value? Famously, Good (1967) proved it under certain
assumptions. But it turns out that those assumptions were inconsistent with our Modest
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Truism.29 What happens when we loosen them?
Recall our story. In searching for a modest guide, we discovered that we must: permit
modesty; forbid Misguided Evidence; permit Reflection failures; require Reaction; re-
quire Reliance; require surely-factivity; require positive access; forbid Effacing Evidence;
require Trust.
Value runs the gamut. It permits modesty. It forbids Misguided Evidence. It permits
Reflection failures. It requires Reaction. It requires Reliance. It requires surely-factivity.
It requires positive access. It forbids Effacing Evidence. It requires Trust:
Theorem 7.2. In any dynamic probability frame: if Value holds at a world, Informed
Trust does as well.
In fact—in (at least) a wide class of scenarios—it is equivalent to Trust:
Theorem 7.4 (Rough). In (at least) a wide class of frames: Value ⇔ Informed Trust.
That wide class is the class of prior frames discussed in §5 and Appendix A: models
in which your higher-order uncertainty stems from uncertainty about what you should
be sure of. Moreover, the restriction is on the proof—not the truth. There is reason to
think that (Informed) Trust is equivalent to Value in full generality. I conjecture that it
is (Conjecture 7.3, Appendix A.2). But even if that conjecture fails, we now know that
some strengthening of Trust will succeed. Upshot: we know that Trust is necessary—
and in at least a wide class of cases, sufficient—to vindicate our Guiding Truism. And
we have reason to think that Trust characterizes our Guiding Truism: that no stronger
theory is needed, and no weaker theory will do.
A final point: Theorem 7.4 is a “coincidence result.” The progression of this project
was not so prescient as the progression of this paper: I began with various puzzles of
higher-order uncertainty, was led (through trial and error) to Trust, and characterized
it over a class of prior frames. Only later did I discover that Geanakoplos (1989) had
proven that (a principle like) Value was validated by the exact same class of prior frames.
Imagine my surprise—shock even—upon seeing his theorem. And my satisfaction upon
discovering it could be strengthened, yielding our coincidence. Personally, I think the
fact that this convergence was serendipitous increases the plausibility of our destination.
Perhaps you will agree.
This is the end of our story. Wanting to take disagreement seriously, we began searching
for a modest guide. The obvious proposal—Reflection (defer to expert opinions)—was
too strong, for it failed to acknowledge that learning an expert opinion can be evidence
against p. The natural response—Trust (take expert judgments on trust)—had all the
29Precisely, he assumed that we could model you using a prior frame in which E is an equivalence
relation (see Appendix A.1). Any such frame validates [P (p) = t]↔ S[P (p) = t].
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marks of the Goldilocks principle. And the measure of success—Value (evidence is
valuable)—gave Trust a resounding confirmation. Our search for a modest guide has
succeeded: those who are uncertain can take it on trust.
8 In Consequence
I’ll close by sketching two applications of the theory developed here. Both deserve more
discussion; my goal is just to sketch how Trust is rich in consequences for other debates.
8.1 To Disagreement
We began with a disagreement: you were confident of Top, while Disagreeing Disa was
not. Intuitively, learning that she was not should lead you to lower your confidence in
Top. And we saw that if this is to be so, then our Modest and Guiding Truisms must
both be true. Having found a theory that reconciles them, we can vindicate the intuitive
verdict.
You and Disa are looking at the spoons. For simplicity, suppose you should be sure
that the rational credence in top is either high or low:
(1) S([P (Top) = h] ∨ [P (Top) = l]) (h > l)
Suppose that the rational credence is high:
(2) P (Top) = h
Since Disa is smart, learning that she’s t-confident of Top (CD(Top) = t) provides you
with some reason to think that your evidence warrants having credence t:
(3) P (P (Top) = t|CD(Top) = t) > P (P (Top) = t)
Finally, since Disa’s only route to the truth is through her evidence, once you learn what
your shared evidence warrants, further learning Disa’s actual opinion does not affect the
probability of Top:
(4) P (Top|P (Top) = t) = P (Top|[P (Top) = t] ∧ [CD(Top) = s])
This is a paradigm peer-disagreement scenario. Alone, (1)– (4) do not require you to
lower your confidence when you learn that Disa disagrees; but given Trust, they do:
Fact 8.1. (1)– (4) are consistent with P (Top|CD(Top) < h) ≥ P (Top). But given Trust,
(1)– (4) imply P (Top|CD(Top) < h) < P (Top).
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Clearly this is only the beginnings of a theory of how to respond to disagreement. But
it is a possibility proof: it shows that there is a principled way to take disagreement
seriously. The next step is to find general rules delineating in what situations and to
what extent Trust requires doing so. Trust gives answers—we just have to find them.
Upshot: Trust lays the foundations for a theory of disagreement.
8.2 To KK
In the wake of Williamson (2000) it has become popular to combine two views:
Knowledge First
Knowledge plays the fundamental role in epistemology.
No KK
You can be in a position to know p without being in a position to know that
you are (Kp ∧ ¬KKp).
Our theory puts pressure on this conjunction. For it is difficult to maintain Knowledge
First without endorsing a close connection between knowledge and rational degrees
of belief—after all, it is the latter that encode what you should think and determine
what you should do. The natural way to forge this connection is through rational
certainty: you should be sure of p iff you’re in a position to know p (Sp ↔ Kp). But
rationality must be something that we ought to treat as a guide. This, in turn, requires
Trust and Value—both of which imply positive access:
Fact 8.2. In any probability frame: if Value or Trust hold at a world, then Sp→ SSp
does as well.
If knowledge is to be first, positive access in turn leads to KK: you are in a position to
know p only if you’re in a position to know that you are (Kp→ KKp).
Upshot: Trust forces a choice between Knowledge First and No KK.30
9 A Modest Goal
I have a modest goal. Literally. My goal is an epistemology informed by modesty.
Because you and I are modest: we are constantly wondering whether we are thinking
and doing as we should. And we are not irrational for that. Given the sort of critters
30Knowledge First relies on a systematic and wide-ranging epistemological program. No KK rests,
primarily, on subtle margin-for-error-like arguments (Williamson 2000; Bacon 2013) that can be resisted
on a variety of grounds (Sharon and Spectre 2008; Greco 2014b; Stalnaker 2015; Das and Salow 2016).
Given that we face a choice, I say that No KK should be the one to go.
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we are—and the sort of mistakes we make—we should have a healthy dose of self-doubt.
My goal is an epistemology that makes room for critters like us—a modest epistemology.
In this paper, I’ve tried to secure its foundations. I argued that in order to take
disagreement seriously, evidence must be a modest guide (§2); that the intuitive guiding
principle—Reflection—rules out modesty entirely (§3); that its natural refinement—
Trust—allows modesty while guaranteeing a correlation between evidence and truth
(§§4–5); that denying Trust risks allowing you to know that your evidence is anti -
correlated with truth (§6); that Trust characterizes the platitude that you should prefer
to use free evidence (§7); and that the resulting theory does require you to take dis-
agreement seriously (§8). In short, Trust demonstrates that there is a coherent, rational
way to have a healthy dose of self-doubt. There are two directions to take it from here.
The first is toward extensions. The theoretical arguments of this paper pinpoint a
particular structure of evidence. Structure in hand, we face both formal and philosoph-
ical questions. What is the general relation between Value, Trust, and that structure?
And what sort of thing must evidence be, if it is to have that structure?
The second is toward applications. We now know how to model higher-order prob-
abilities in a principled, coherent way. What does this tell us about. . .
. . . how to analyze disagreement and debunking (Christensen 2010a)?
. . . how to model “ambiguous” evidence (Joyce 2010)?
. . . how to rely on people who don’t know their own opinions (Roush 2016)?
. . . how to defer to chances that don’t know their own values (Briggs 2009)?
Foundations secured. Next step: developing modest answers to our new questions.31
A. Formal Details
In Appendix A I explain the formal details underlying the results stated in this paper.
This section explains probability frames and how they encode higher-order information.
§A.1 explains the special case of prior frames, how they can be used to characterize
Trust, and how to interpret the tree-like structures that result. §A.2 explains how to
generalize such frames to capture multiple bodies of evidence, and uses this generaliza-
tion to characterize Value and Informed Trust.
A probability frame 〈W,P〉 consists of a finite set of worlds W and a function
P from worlds w to probability functions Pw defined over the subsets of W (cf. Samet
1997; Dorst 2018a). Pw represents the credences that you ought to have at w. Since
31I can’t thank everyone who has helped me with this long project. I received valuable feedback
from Laura Callahan, Kenny Easwaran, Branden Fitelson, Brooke Husic, Harvey Lederman, Hanti Lin,
Eric Pacuit, Miriam Schoenfield, Kieran Setiya, Jack Spencer, Steve Yablo, and many others. Special
thanks to Bernhard Salow, Ginger Schultheis, Bob Stalnaker, and Roger White for sticking with me.
And to Gillian Russell—for getting me started.
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rational uncertainty is modeled as uncertainty about which world you’re in, and the
rational credence function varies across worlds, you can have rational uncertainty about
what the rational credence function is.
A proposition p is (any) set of worlds: p ⊆ W . p is true at w iff w ∈ p. Logical
operations on propositions are captured with set-theoretic ones: ¬p = W − p; p ∧ q =
p∩ q; etc. Probabilistic facts are captured in the obvious ways by using the probability
functions associated with each world. Thus the proposition that the rational credence
in p is t is the set of worlds w such that Pw(p) = t: [P (p) = t] =df {w|Pw(p) = t}.
Similarly for other probabilistic propositions. Since these higher-order claims are simply
sets of worlds, they get assigned probabilities like any other proposition.
Example. Let W = {a, b} with Pa(a) = 0.6 (so Pa(b) = 0.4) and Pb(a) = 0.3 (so
Pb(b) = 0.7). We can diagram this with an arrow labeled t from x to y indicating that





Figure 3: A probability frame.
In this frame, [P (a) = 0.6] = {a} (since Pa(a) = 0.6 and Pb(a) = 0.3), so in turn
[P (P (a) = .6) = 0.6] is the set of worlds w such that Pw(P (a) = .6) = 0.6, i.e. the set of w
such that Pw({a}) = 0.6, i.e. {a} itself: [P (P (a) = .6) = 0.6] = {a}. Meanwhile, [P (a) =
0.3] = {b} (at b, you should be 0.3 confident you’re at a); [P (P (a) = .6) = 0.3] = {b}
(at b, you should be 0.3 confident that you should be 0.6 confident that you’re at a);
[P (P (P (a) = .6) = .6) = 0.3] = {b} (at b, you should be 0.3 confident that you should be
0.6 confident that you should be 0.6 confident that you’re at a); and so on. As can be
seen, in such frames there can be rational uncertainty all the way up.
A.1 Trust the Details
To characterize Trust we will make use of a natural, tractable subclass of probability
frames. Given a probability frame 〈W,P〉, say that the evidence at w leaves open w′—
and write wEw′—iff Pw(w′) > 0. The set of worlds that the evidence at w leaves
open is Ew =df {w′|wEw′} = {w′|Pw(w′) > 0}. A prior frame is a probability frame
in which there is a unique prior pi such that the probability function Pw at each world
w can be recovered by conditioning pi on Ew. Precisely: a prior frame 〈W,E, pi〉 is a
probability frame 〈W,P〉 in which there is a regular probability distribution pi over W
(i.e. ∀w ∈W : pi(w) > 0)—the prior—such that for all w: Pw = pi(·|Ew) (cf. Williamson
2000, 2014, 2018; Cresto 2012; Lasonen-Aarnio 2015; Salow 2017).
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Formally, since the variation in probabilities across worlds is all traceable to the bin-
ary relation E, prior frames are based on a standard Kripke frame 〈W,E〉. This allows
us to use the ordinary tools of modal logic to render them tractable.32 Philosophically,
prior frames are natural given several different background pictures. These pictures all
agree on two things: (1) rational opinion is separable into two components—(i) which
standards of reasoning you should be using (pi), and (ii) what you should take for gran-
ted (Ew); and (2) rational agents should know which standards of reasoning they should
be using. Different approaches will fill out the components in different ways, but all will
agree that what you should do is take that prior pi and condition it on your evidence Ew.
And all can allow modesty—for even if you know what prior you should use, you can
be uncertain what you should condition on. (Moreover, even if we reject such pictures,
prior frames still capture an important case of modesty—so are a useful tool.)
We can now characterize Trust. First, some definitions. When xEy, I’ll say “x sees y.”
A frame 〈W,E〉 is transitive iff: if x sees y and y sees z, then x sees z: (xEy ∧ yEz)⇒
xEz. A frame is shift-reflexive iff any world seen by anything sees itself: xEy ⇒ yEy.
A frame is shift-nested iff whenever two worlds are seen, either one sees everything
the other does or they see nothing in common: wEx, y ⇒ (Ex ⊆ Ey or Ex ⊇ Ey or
Ex ∩ Ey = ∅). These conditions characterize Trust:
Theorem 5.7 (Trust Characterization). A prior frame 〈W,E, pi〉 validates Trust iff
〈W,E〉 is transitive, shift-reflexive, and shift-nested.
Such frames are composed of structures like Figure 4. (Circles drawn around worlds
that see exactly the same worlds; transitive arrows omitted.)
Figure 4: A transitive, shift-reflexive, and shift-nested frame.
What we have is a tree.33 The arrows can proceed down chains and splits, but they can
never split and reconnect, as in Figure 5 below.
32Note: in any prior frame 〈W,E, pi〉, E must be serial: ∀x∃y : xEy.
33Formally: if we take equivalence classes under E and force it irreflexive, the resulting structure of
every Ew becomes a forest in graph-theoretic parlance.
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How do these constraints map onto the structure of evidence discussed in §5? Shift-
reflexivity corresponds to surely-factivity: you should be sure that if you should be sure
of p, then p is true; S(Sp→ p). Transitivity corresponds to positive access: you should
be sure of p only if you should be sure that you should be; Sp→ SSp.
Although shift-nesting does not correspond to an axiom that can be stated with the
modal operator S, we can use other tools to get a grip on it. To see this, consider one
interpretation of (a slight refinement of) our tree-structures. A frame is reflexive if
every world sees itself: xEx. It is nested if for every pair of worlds, either one sees
everything the other does or they see nothing in common: (Ex ⊆ Ey or Ex ⊇ Ey or
Ex ∩ Ey = ∅). We’ll consider the set of transitive, reflexive, nested frames.
Think of the evidence as warranting not merely a set of conclusions, but also a
line of reasoning to that set of conclusions. Lines of reasoning—like proofs—are path-
dependent: “p; q; therefore, p ∧ q” is a different line of reasoning than “q; p; therefore,
p ∧ q.” On this picture, you should leave open that a state might be the rational one
only if it is an extension of the line of reasoning you should take. Since no two lines
of reasoning can diverge and still wind up in the same place, this is why we get the
“branching” structure. Precisely: say that 〈W,E〉 is reasoning-generable iff there is
a function f from worlds w to sequences of propositions f(w) such that: wEx iff f(w) is
an initial segment of f(x). (Think of f(w) as the sequence of conclusions that represent
the line of reasoning you should take, given your evidence.) Then:
Theorem 5.8. 〈W,E〉 is reasoning-generable iff it is reflexive, transitive, and nested.
This gives some sense to our tree structures; but why would your evidence warrant
concluding p earlier in your line of reasoning than concluding q? Notice that if you
have rationally concluded p but not q (P (p) = 1 but P (q) < 1), then conditional on only
one of p and q being true, you should be certain it’s p: P (p|¬(p ∧ q)) = 1; you should
think to yourself, “Supposing that at most one p or q is true, I’m sure it’s p.” In other
words, your epistemic access to p is more robust than your epistemic access to q. That
may be why your evidence warrants concluding p earlier in your line of reasoning than
concluding q.
We can reinforce this point with some independent resources. On most theories
of conditionals, being conditionally certain of p given ¬(p ∧ q) (i.e. P (p|¬(p ∧ q)) = 1)
implies that you should be certain of the indicative conditional, If at most one of p
or q is true, then it’s p. Notice that our certainties in such conditionals encode facts
about how epistemically robust their components are. I’m certain that Oswald shot
Kennedy. But I’m also certain that (1) if Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, then someone
else did. My certainty in (1) is no trivial consequence of the fact that I’m certain that
the antecedent is false—for notice that I do not believe that if Oswald didn’t shoot
Kennedy, then no one else did. Rather, my certainty in (1) encodes the fact that my
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certainty that someone shot Kennedy is more robust than my certainty that Oswald
did—if you were to remove my certainty of the latter, I’d still be sure of the former.
Thinking of indicative conditionals as capturing epistemic dependence in this way makes
two (widely-endorsed) theses extremely natural. Let ‘q  p’ represent the indicative
conditional If q, then p. Then:
a) If P (p|q) = 1, then P (q p) = 1.
If conditional on q you should be sure of p, then you should be sure of if q, p.
b) If P (q p) = 1, then P (q ¬p) < 1 (for q 6= ∅).
If you should be sure of if q, p, then you should not be sure of if q, ¬p.
(a) is an instance of the widely-attested Ramseyan thesis that the probability of an
indicative conditional equals the corresponding conditional probability.34 (b) is a con-
sequence of the principle of “conditional non-contradiction” (not: if q, then p and if q,
then ¬p), as well as the belief-revision principle that if you’re certain of if q, p, then
upon learning that q you should be certain of p (cf. Stalnaker 1984).
Say that a frame 〈W,E〉 is conditionable iff we can define a two-place propositional
connective satisfying (a) and (b). Then in order to have a sensible connection between
conditional-beliefs and beliefs in conditionals, we need a tree-structure:
Fact 5.9. A reflexive, transitive 〈W,E, pi〉 is conditionable iff it is nested.35
To see why this is so, it will help to illustrate how Fact 5.9 furnishes a response to an
objection to nesting (Das 2017; Williamson 2018). One type of higher-order uncertainty
arises with a good/bad-case asymmetry: looking at a real painting, you can tell it’s not
a fake; but looking at a fake, you should be unsure whether it’s the real thing (Lasonen-
Aarnio 2015). Thus in the good case you can tell you’re in the good case, but in the
bad case you should be unsure which case you’re in; omitting reflexive arrows, we have a
structure like this: b→ g. Now suppose you are looking at two independent paintings.
Shouldn’t we expect a non-nested structure such as in Figure 5? (gb is where the first
painting is real and the second is fake, etc; reflexive, transitive arrows omitted.)
I object to this model, for it implies inconsistent comparisons of epistemic robustness.
Notice that at gb, conditional on one of the paintings being fake, you should be certain
that the first one is real: Pgb(gb|¬gg) = 1. Thus, applying (a), at gb you should be certain
34See Ramsey 1931; Stalnaker 1970; Adams 1975; van Fraassen 1976; Edgington 1995; Bennett 2003;
Khoo 2013, 2016; Rothschild 2013; Bacon 2015. Note that there is no risk of triviality from (a).
35It follows from Fact 5.9 that no triviality results (a` la Lewis 1976; Bradley 2000; Russell and
Hawthorne 2016) can be proven from conditionability. Why? Because triviality results happen when
you impose a connection between credences in conditionals and conditional credences for all probability
functions (e.g. Bradley 2000). There is no threat if we only impose the connection for a particular
probability function that is coordinated with the conditional (cf. Mandelkern and Khoo 2018)—as
conditionability does.





Figure 5: A non-nested frame.
of the conditional, if only one of them is real, it’s the first one: Pgb(¬gg gb) = 1.
Since you are certain of this conditional and you leave open that you are at world gg,
the conditional must be true at gg. And since at gg you should be certain you’re at
gg, it follows that at gg you should be certain of the conditional: Pgg(¬gg  gb) = 1.
Of course, at gg you should be certain that the antecedent of this conditional is false.
But—as we saw with the Oswald example above—that does not trivialize your attitude;
rather, your certainty in the conditional means that at gg your certainty that the first
painting is real should be more robust than your certainty that the second one is. Here
lies the problem: the cases are symmetric! Parallel reasoning starting from bg would
lead to the opposite conclusion that in gg you should be certain that if only one of them
it real, it’s the second one; thus your certainty that the first one is real is less robust
than your certainty that the second one is. Contradiction.
Fact 5.9 implies that to make this case consistent with principles (a) and (b), we
must divide the gg-possibilities into ones that make true different facts about epistemic
robustness. For instance, we may have one possibility (gg1) where your evidential access
to the first painting is more robust than your evidential access to the second, one (gg2)







I conclude that there is plenty of motivation—from Trust, conditionals, and (as we will
see) the value of evidence—to defend nesting against the model given in Figure 5.
A.2 Value the Details
To formalize and then characterize Value, we must generalize our frames to allow for
multiple bodies of evidence. A dynamic probability frame 〈W,P1,P2〉 is a general-
ization of a probability frame. It associates a world w with two probability functions P1w
and P2w. The intended interpretation is that P1w is the rational credence function given
body 1 of evidence, and P2w is the rational credence function given body 2 of evidence—
with 2 at least as informed as 1. (Thus we expect 1 to defer to itself and 2, but 2 to
defer only to itself.) Propositions about probabilities are now indexed to their respect-
ive body of evidence; for i = 1, 2: [P i(p) = t] =df {w|Piw(p) = t}. Convention: when
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using multiple variables to range over probability statements, I will use i and k with
the constraint that k ≥ i. Thus the statement [P i(P k(p) = 0.7) ≥ 0.4] expresses three
claims: [P 1(P 1(p) = 0.7) ≥ 0.4], [P 1(P 2(p) = 0.7) ≥ 0.4], and [P 2(P 2(p) = 0.7) ≥ 0.4].
Given a dynamic probability frame 〈W,P1,P2〉, write wEiw′ iff Piw(w′) > 0. The
set of worlds that evidence i leaves open at w is Eiw =df {w′|Piw(w′) > 0}. A dynamic
prior frame 〈W,E1, E2, pi〉 is a dynamic probability frame 〈W,P1,P2〉 in which there
is a regular probability distribution pi over W such that for all w: Piw = pi(·|Eiw).
Dynamic probability frames can interpret Value and Informed Trust. The latter
is easy: it says P iq(p|P kq (p) ≥ t) ≥ t (with k ≥ i), and is valid iff all its instances are.
How to formalize Value? Given a dynamic (probability or prior) frame F , we can
enrich it with a decision problem 〈O,U〉: a set of options O and a real-valued utility
function U .36 Uw(o) is the value of taking option o at world w. The expected value of
an option o, according to evidence i, at world w, is an average of the various possible
values of U(o), with weights determined by how likely (according to Piw) they are.
Formally:Eiw[U(o)] =df
∑
w′ Piw(w′)Uw′(o). What about the expected value, according
to evidence i, of taking the option that is warranted by evidence k (whatever it is)?
Since what k warrants believing (Pkw) varies across worlds, what k warrants doing does
as well: if you’re at w, then k warrants taking an option o that maximizes expected value
by the lights of Pkw. So just as we have a function Pk from worlds to probability functions
that captures what you should think given evidence k, so too we’ll have a function d
that takes a body of evidence k and outputs a function dk from worlds to options that
captures what you should do given evidence k. Precisely: given a frame plus decision
problem 〈F,O,U〉, d is (a variable over) any function from evidence k to a function dk





expected value relative to evidence i of doing what evidence k warrants is the expected




With these definitions we can formalize propositions about expected values in the
obvious ways, e.g. [Ei[U(dk)] ≥ Ei[U(o)]] =df {w|Eiw[U(dk)] ≥ Eiw[U(o)]}. Thus:
Value: Ei[U(dk)] ≥ Ei[U(o)] (o ∈ O, k ≥ i)
You should always expect taking the option warranted by informed evidence to
be at least as good as you expect any other particular option to be.
Slogan: evidence is valuable.
As with Trust, Value has three types of instances depending on whether i = 1 = k,
i = 1 and k = 2, or i = 2 = k. Value holds at a world w in a dynamic frame F iff for
36Technical constraint: if W is the set of worlds in frame F , then 〈O,U〉 must be such that for any pi
over W , there is at least one option with maximal pi-expected utility: maxo∈O(Epi [U(o)]) is non-empty.
A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for this is for O to be finite.
37Since d captures a strategy of responding to evidence, we impose the constraint that it cannot vary
across worlds where the relevant evidence warrants the exact same beliefs: if Pix = Pky , then dix = dky .
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every decision problem 〈O,U〉: all instances of Value are true at w in 〈F,O,U〉. Value
is valid iff it holds at all worlds.
What does it take to validate Value? In full generality, we have partial answers:
Fact 7.1. In any dynamic probability frame: if Misguided Evidence or Effacing Evidence
are true at a world, Value fails.
Theorem 7.2. In any dynamic probability frame: if Value holds at a world, Informed
Trust does as well.
Thus we know that, in full generality, Trust is necessary for Value. The converse remains
an open question:
Conjecture 7.3. In any dynamic probability frame: if Informed Trust holds at a world,
then Value does as well.
But within our tractable subclass—dynamic prior frames—the question is closed. First,
some generalizations of our definitions. A dynamic frame 〈W,E1, E2〉 is transitive iff
(xEiy ∧ yEiz) ⇒ xEiz. It is shift-reflexive iff xEiy ⇒ yEky. It is shift-nested iff
wEix, y ⇒ (Ekx ⊆ Eky or Ekx ⊇ Eky or Ekx ∩ Eky = ∅). Finally, a dynamic frame is shift-
updating iff if a world is seen by anything, it does not lose information between E1 and
E2: xEiy ⇒ E2y ⊆ E1y . Shift-updating corresponds to the surely-monotonicity axiom
that you should be sure that if your evidence warrants being sure of p, a body of evidence
at least as informed as your own will likewise warrant being sure of p: Si(Sip→ Skp).
These conditions characterize both Informed Trust and Value:
Theorem 7.4 (Value ⇔ Trust). The following are equivalent:
(1) The dynamic prior frame 〈W,E1, E2, pi〉 validates Informed Trust.
(2) 〈W,E1, E2〉 is transitive, shift-reflexive, shift-nested, and shift-updating.
(3) The dynamic prior frame 〈W,E1, E2, pi〉 validates Value.
Upshot: within dynamic prior frames, Trust characterizes the value of evidence.38
B. Proofs
Fact 3.1. If a probability frame validates Reflection, it validates [P (Immodest) = 1].
Proof. Immodest is true at x iff Px(P = Px) = 1. So it will suffice to take a probabil-
ity frame that validates Reflection, suppose that Pw(P = pi) > 0, and then show that
pi(P = pi) = 1. First suppose pi(P = pi) = 0; then Pw([P = pi] ∧ [P (P = pi) = 0]) > 0, hence
38The implication from (2) to (3) is a generalization of Geanakoplos (1989), Theorem 1—a result
that was key to my discovery of the connection between Trust and Value.
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Pw(P = pi|P (P = pi) = 0) > 0, contradicting Reflection. So pi(P = pi) > 0. We show that
for an arbitrary world y such that pi(y) = t > 0, it follows that pi(P (y) = t) = 1. By
Reflection, pi(y|P (y) = t) = t, implying that y ∈ [P (y) = t]. But if pi(P (y) = t) < 1, then
pi(y|P (y) = t) = pi(y∧[P (y)=t])pi(P (y)=t) = pi(y)pi(P (y)=t) > pi(y)1 = t, i.e. pi(y|P (y) = t) > t, contradict-
ing Reflection. Since y was arbitrary: ∀z ∈ W : if pi(z) = t, then pi(P (z) = t) = 1. Since
any probability function over W is fully determined by the probabilities it assigns to
worlds, it follows that pi(P = pi) = 1.
Remark 4.0. For any (finite) probability frame and any p, q, t, there is an  > 0 such
that [Pq(p) > t] = [Pq(p) ≥ t+ ]. (Take the w ∈ [Pq(p) > t] with minimal Pw(p|q) and
set  =df (Pw(p|q)− t).) So if 〈W,P〉 validates Trust, it also validates Pq(p|Pq(p) > t) > t.
Fact 4.1. In any probability frame: Trust holds at a world iff Pq(p|Pq(p) ≤ t) ≤ t does.
Proof. Note that [Pq(p) ≤ t] = [Pq(¬p) ≥ 1− t]. If Trust holds, then Pq(¬p|P (¬p) ≥ 1− t) ≥
1− t, iff Pq(¬p|P (p) ≤ t) ≥ 1− t, iff Pq(p|P (p) ≤ t) ≤ t. Similarly for the converse.
Fact 4.2. There are probability frames that validate Trust in which Reflection fails at
all worlds.
Proof. The frame from Fact 5.1 validates Trust, yet it is easy to check that Reflection
fails at all worlds.
Fact 4.3. In any probability frame, if Trust holds, and for a given l, h ∈ [0, 1] it’s true
that P (S(P (p) ∈ [l, h])
∣∣P (p) ∈ [l, h]) = 1, then P (p|P (p) ∈ [l, h]) ∈ [l, h].
Proof. Suppose Trust holds, and P (S(P (p) ∈ [l, h])
∣∣P (p) ∈ [l, h]) = 1. Let q =df [P (p) ∈ [l, h]].
Then Pq(P = Pq) = 1 (since conditional on q, you should be sure that the rational
credence was already certain of q). Since Trust implies shift-reflexivity, the fact that
Pq(S(P (p) ∈ [l, h])) = 1 implies that Pq(P (p) ∈ [l, h]) = 1; thus Pq(Pq(p) ∈ [l, h]) = 1. By
Trust, Pq(p) = Pq(p|Pq(p) ≥ l) ≥ l, and Pq(p) = Pq(p|Pq(p) ≤ h) ≤ h, and so Pq(p) =
P (p|P (p) ∈ [l, h]) ∈ [l, h].
Fact 5.1. There are probability frames that validate both Trust and [P (modest) = 1].
Proof. Brute force method. Let W = {a, b}, Pa(a) = 0.6 (so Pa(b) = 0.4), and symmet-
rically Pb(b) = 0.6 (so Pb(a) = 0.4). modest =df {w|0 < Pw(P = Pw) < 1}. Since both
Pa and Pb assign positive probability to [P = Pa] and [P = Pb], modest = W , hence
[P (modest) = 1] = W . Moreover, this frame validates Trust. Since the frame is symmet-
ric, it suffices to show that Trust holds at a. There are two nontrivial propositions: {a}
and {b}. If q = ∅, Pq is undefined at all worlds; if q = {a} or q = {b}, Pq(a) = 1 or
Pq(b) = 1 (respectively), so Trust holds trivially. So we need only show that for q = W ,
Trust holds. For t1 ≤ 0.4, [P (a) ≥ t1] = W ; hence Pa(a|P (a) ≥ t1) = Pa(a) = .6 ≥ t1.
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For t2 ∈ (0.4, 0.6], [P (a) ≥ t2] = {a}; hence Pa(a|P (a) ≥ t2) = Pa(a|a) = 1 ≥ t2. For
t3 ∈ (0.6, 1], [P (a) ≥ t3] = ∅, so Pa(·|P (a) ≥ t3) is undefined. Similarly: For t1 ≤ 0.4,
[P (b) ≥ t1] = W ; hence Pa(b|P (b) ≥ t1) = Pa(a) = .4 ≥ t1. For t2 ∈ (0.4, 0.6],
[P (b) ≥ t2] = {b}; hence Pa(b|P (b) ≥ t2) = Pa(b|b) = 1 ≥ t2. For t3 ∈ (0.6, 1],
[P (b) ≥ t3] = ∅, so Pa(·|P (b) ≥ t3) is undefined. Thus Trust holds at a and, by symmetry,
is valid.
Fact 5.2. For any T = {t1, ..., tn} ⊂ [0, 1], there are probability frames that validate
Trust with a candidate pi and proposition p such that pi(P (p) ∈ T ) ≈ 1 and for all ti:
pi(P (p) = ti) ≈ 1n . (s ≈ t means that s ∈ [t− , t+ ], for arbitrarily small  > 0.)
Proof. Take any T = {t1, ..., tn} ⊂ [0, 1] and  > 0. By Theorem 5.7, it will suffice
to construct a shift-reflexive, transitive, shift-nested prior frame 〈W,E, pi〉 with the
desired property. Let W = {w, a1, b1, ..., an, bn}. Define E so that Ew = W while
Eai = Ebi = {ai, bi}. Clearly this frame is reflexive (every world sees itself), transitive
(if xEy, Ey ⊆ Ex), and nested (if Ex 6⊆ Ey and Ey 6⊆ Ex, then Ex ∩ Ey = ∅), so
any prior over it will validate Trust. In particular, let pi(w) = , and for each ti, let
pi(ai) =
ti











n )(1− ) = + (1− ) = 1, so pi is probability function.
Since Ew = W , Pw = pi; since Pw(w) > 0, Pw = pi will be our candidate. Let






[P (p) = ti] is true at {ai, bi} (and so [P (p) = tj ] for tj 6= ti is false at {ai, bi}). In general
for all ti ∈ T : [P (p) = ti] = {ai, bi} unless Pw(p) = tj for some tj ∈ T , in which case
[P (p) = tj ] = {aj , bj , w}. Since pi(w) = , it follows that pi(P (p) ∈ T ) ≥ pi(¬{w}) = 1− .
And for any ti ∈ T : pi(P (p) = ti) ≥ pi({ai, bi}) = 1n (1− ) = 1n − n ≥ 1n − . Similarly,
pi(P (p) = ti) ≤ pi({ai, bi, w}) = 1n (1− ) +  ≤ 1n − n +  ≤ 1n + , as desired.
Fact 5.3. A probability frame validates Trust iff it validates both Reaction and Reliance.
Proof. (⇒) : Suppose Trust is valid. Consider Reaction: if Pq(Pq(p) ∈ [l, h]) = 1 is
true at a given world, then Pq(p) = Pq(p|Pq(p) ≥ l), which by Trust is ≥ l. Similarly,
Pq(p) = Pq(p|Pq(p) ≤ h), which by Trust and Fact 4.1 is ≤ h. So Pq(p) ∈ [l, h]. Reaction
is valid. Consider Reliance. Trust, Fact 4.1, and Remark 4.0 imply that Pq(p|Pq(p) ≥ t) ≥
t > Pq(p|Pq(p) < t) whenever both are well-defined. By total probability, it follows that
Pq(p|Pq(p) ≥ t) ≥ Pq(p) whenever well-defined.
(⇐) : Suppose Reaction and Reliance are valid. First note that Reaction requires
that if Pw(x) > 0, then Px(x) > 0 (shift-reflexivity). Two steps. First, if Pw(x) > 0 and
Px(y) > 0, then Pw(y) > 0 (transitivity). For if not, then Pw(y|{x, y}) = 0 even though
Pw(P (y) > 0|{x, y}) = 1. Now suppose Pw(x) > 0 but Px(x) = 0. Px(y) > 0 for some
y. If Py(x) > 0, by transitivity Px(x) > 0. If not, then Pw(P (x|{x, y}) = 0
∣∣{x, y}) = 1,
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yet since Pw(x) > 0 then Pw(x|{x, y}) > 0, contradicting Reaction. Now suppose
Pq(p|Pq(p) ≥ t) is well-defined at an arbitrary x. Take arbitrary w ∈ q ∧ [Pq(p) ≥ t]
such that Px(w|q ∧ [Pq(p) ≥ t]) > 0. By shift-reflexivity, Pw(p|q ∧ [Pq(p) ≥ t]) is well-
defined and by Reliance it is at least Pw(p|q). Since w ∈ [Pq(p) ≥ t], it follows that
Pw(p|q ∧ [Pq(p) ≥ t]) ≥ t. Since w was arbitrary, Px(Pq(p|q ∧ [Pq(p) ≥ t]) ≥ t|q ∧ [Pq(p) ≥ t]) = 1.
Letting r =df q ∧ [Pq(p) ≥ t], that is: Px(Pr(p) ≥ t|r) = 1, so by Reaction, Px(p|r) = 1,
i.e. Pq(p|Pq(p) ≥ t) ≥ t is true at x. Since x was arbitrary, Trust is valid.
Fact 5.4. If Trust holds at a world in a probability frame, Misguided Evidence does not.
Proof. Suppose P (p ∧ [P (p) < t]) ≥ t. Since P (P (p) < t) ≤ 1, it follows that
P (p∧[P (p)<t])
P (P (p)<t) ≥ t, i.e. P (p|P (p) < t) ≥ t, violating Trust (Remark 4.0 and Fact 4.1).
Fact 5.5. In any probability frame: if Trust holds then [P (P (p) ≥ t) ≥ s]→ [P (p) ≥ t·s]
does too. No stronger connection holds: for any t, s ∈ [0, 1]: there are probability frames
that validate Trust and make both [P (P (p) ≥ t) ≥ s] and [P (p) = t·s] true at a world.
Proof. Suppose Trust holds and P (P (p) ≥ t) ≥ s is true. By Trust, P (p|P (p) ≥ t) ≥ t;
by total probability, P (p) = P (P (p) ≥ t) · P (p|P (p) ≥ t) + P (P (p) < t) · P (p|P (p) < t) ≥
P (P (p) ≥ t) · P (p|P (p) ≥ t) ≥ s·t, so P (p) ≥ t·s.
Take any t, s ∈ [0, 1]. Supposing t, s ∈ (0, 1), consider a prior frame 〈W,E, pi〉 with
W = {a, b, c}, Ea = {a, b, c}, Eb = Ec = {b, c}, and pi(a) = 1 − s, pi(b) = t ·s, and
pi(c) = (1 − t)s. This frame is reflexive, transitive, and nested, so by Theorem 5.7 it
validates Trust. Letting p = {b}, Pw(p) = t ·s, so [P (p) = t ·s] is true at w. And
Pb(p) = Pc(p) = t·ss = t, hence {b, c} ⊆ [P (p) ≥ t]. Since Pw({b, c}) = s, it follows that
[P (P (p) ≥ t) ≥ s] is also true at w. Finally, if we allow t, s to be extremal, it is routine
to modify the frame (dropping worlds as needed) to ensure that pi is regular and hence
that we have a prior frame.
Theorem 5.7 (Trust Characterization). A prior frame 〈W,E, pi〉 validates Trust iff
〈W,E〉 is transitive, shift-reflexive, and shift-nested.
Proof. A prior frame 〈W,E, pi〉 is a special case of a dynamic prior frame 〈W,E1, E2, pi〉,
setting E1 = E2. In this case, (1) Informed Trust is equivalent to Trust and (2) shift-
updating is trivially satisfied; hence the result follows from Theorem 7.4.
Theorem 5.8. 〈W,E〉 is reasoning-generable iff it is reflexive, transitive, and nested.
Proof. (⇒) : Suppose W,E is reasoning-generable. Reflexivity: Since f(w) is an initial
segment of f(w), wEw. Transitivity: If f(w) is an initial segment of f(x) and f(x)
is an initial segment of f(y), then f(w) is an initial segment of f(y). Nested: Given
transitivity, a frame is nested iff if xEz and yEz, then xEy or yEx. And if f(x) and
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f(y) are both initial segments of f(z), then one (or both) must be an initial segment of
the other.
(⇐:) For the converse, we need some definitions and a lemma.
Definition 5.8.a. Ey is an expansion of Ex iff Ey ⊃ Ex. And Ey is a minimal
expansion of Ex iff Ey is an expansion of Ex, and for any expansion Ez of Ex, Ez ⊇ Ey.
Lemma 5.8.b. If 〈W,E〉 is transitive and nested, then if Ex has an expansion, it has
a minimal expansion.
Proof. Suppose, for reductio, Ex has an expansion but has no minimal expansion. Thus:
(∀Ey ⊃ Ex)(∃Ez ⊃ Ex) such that Ez 6⊇ Ey (*)
W (hence Ex) is finite, so suppose |Ex| = n. Since Ex has a positive but finite number
of expansions (since ℘(W ) is finite), there must be a k > n such that (∀Ey ⊃ Ex)
|Ey| ≥ k and (∃Ey ⊃ Ex) |Ey| = k. Take some such Ey with |Ey| = k. By (*), there is
an Ez ⊃ Ex such that Ez 6⊇ Ey. (Hence Ez 6= Ey.) If Ez ⊆ Ey, then since Ez 6= Ey,
Ez ⊂ Ey, and hence Ez is an expansion of Ex with |Ez| < |Ey| = k. Contradiction.
Thus Ez 6⊆ Ey. Since also Ez 6⊇ Ey, since E is nested it follows that Ez ∩ Ey = ∅. Yet
Ez and Ey are both expansions of Ex, so Ez ∩ Ey ⊇ Ex 6= ∅. Contradiction.
Definition 5.8.c. Given Lemma 5.8.b, in transitive, nested frames we can define a
function M such that given Ex, M(Ex) is Ex’s minimal expansion (if it has an expan-
sion). Define Mn by induction: M1(Ex) = M(Ex), and Mn+1(Ex) = M(Mn(Ex)).
Let E(x) =df 〈Ex,M1(Ex), ...,Mn(Ex)〉 where Mn(Ex) has no expansion.
Lemma 5.8.d. If 〈W,E, pi〉 is transitive and nested, then every expansion Ez of Ex
appears in E(x) = 〈E0, E1, ..., En〉.
Proof. For reductio, suppose not: Ez ⊃ Ex but Ez does not appear in E(x). Since
Ez 6⊃ En (since En has no expansion) but Ez ⊃ E0 = Ex, there must be an i such that
Ez ⊃ Ei but Ez 6⊃ Ei+1. Since Ez 6= Ei+1,M(Ei) = Ey 6= Ez. Since Ey∩Ez ⊇ Ex 6= ∅,
by nesting it follows that Ey ⊇ Ez or Ey ⊆ Ez. Yet if Ey ⊇ Ez, then Ey ⊃ Ez—and since
Ez ⊃ Ei, it follows that Ey is not the minimal expansion of Ei after all: M(Ei) 6= Ey.
Contradiction. And if Ey ⊆ Ez, then Ey ⊂ Ez. Yet Ey = Ei+1, meaning Ei+1 ⊂ Ez,
contradicting what was established above.
We can now prove the right-to-left direction of Theorem 5.8. Suppose E is reflex-
ive, transitive, and nested. Given any world x, define f(x) to be the inverse of E(x),
i.e. f(x) = 〈Mn(Ex), ...,M1(Ex), Ex〉. First suppose xEy. By transitivity and re-
flexivity, Ex ⊆ Ey, so Ey is an expansion of Ex. By Lemma 5.8.d, Ey appears in
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E(x) = 〈Ex, ..., Ey,M1(Ey), ...,Mn(Ey)〉, and hence f(y) = 〈Mn(Ey), ..., Ey〉 is an ini-
tial segment of f(x). Conversely, suppose f(x) is an initial segment of f(y). Thus
f(y) = 〈Mn(Ex), ..., Ex, ..., Ey〉, and so E(y) = 〈Ey, ..., Ex, ...,Mn(Ex)〉, so Ex is an
expansion of Ey: Ey ⊆ Ex, and so by reflexivity yEy and thus xEy.
Fact 5.9. A reflexive, transitive 〈W,E, pi〉 is conditionable iff it is nested.
Proof. (⇒) : Suppose we have a reflexive, transitive, non-nested frame; suppose, for
reductio, that it is conditionable. Since nesting fails, we have x, y such that Ex 6⊆ Ey
and Ex 6⊇ Ey and Ex ∩ Ey 6= ∅. Let C =df Ex ∩ Ey. By reflexivity and transitivity we
know Ex ⊃ C ⊂ Ey. Thus Px(Ex|¬C) = 1, so by conditionability Px(¬C  Ex) = 1,
hence (since C ⊆ Ex) C ⊆ [¬C  Ex]. By transitivity, for any c ∈ C, Ec ⊆ C, so
Pc(C) = 1, so (α) : Pc(¬C  Ex) = 1. Meanwhile, since Py(Ey) = 1, Py(Ey|¬C) = 1,
and so Py(Ey ∩ ¬C|¬C) = 1, and thus Py(¬Ex|¬C) = 1, implying Py(¬C  ¬Ex) = 1.
Since C ⊆ Ey, C ⊆ [¬C  ¬Ex], so Pc(¬C  ¬Ex) = 1; contradicting (α) and the
supposition that the frame is conditionable.
(⇐) : Supposing we have a reflexive, transitive, nested frame, we can define E(x) as
in Definition 5.8.c. Given w, let Fwq be the first element of E(w) such that Fwq ∩ q 6= ∅,
or Fwq = W is there is none. Now for any q, p, let [q  p] =df {w|Fwq ∩ q ⊆ p}. We
show this obeys the properties of conditionability. (a): Suppose Pw(p|q) = 1. Then
Ew∩q 6= ∅ and Ew∩q ⊆ p. Now consider any x such x ∈ Ew. By transitivity, Ex∩q ⊆ p.
Since Ew appears in E(x) and Ew ∩ q 6= ∅, by Lemma 5.8.d, F xq appears no later than
Ew in E(x). Thus Ew is an expansion of F xq , so F xq ∩q ⊆ p, and hence x ∈ [q p]. Since
x was arbitrary, Pw(q p) = 1. (b): It’ll suffice to show that for any x, if x ∈ [q p]
for q 6= ∅, then x /∈ [q  ¬p]. Supposing x ∈ [q  p], F xq ∩ q ⊆ p. Since F xq ∩ q 6= ∅,
there is a y ∈ p: y ∈ F xq ∩ q. So F xq ∩ q 6⊆ ¬p; hence x /∈ [q ¬p].
Fact 6.1. If Trust holds at a world in a probability frame, Effacing Evidence does not.
Proof. Suppose S(p↔ [P (p) < t]) and S(¬p↔ [P (p) > t]) are true. If P (p) = 0, then
P (¬p) = 1 and hence P (P (p) > t) = 1; but by Trust and Remark 4.0, P (p|P (p) > t) > t,
implying P (p) > t ≥ 0—contradiction. So P (p) > 0, and hence P (P (p) < t) > 0, so
P (p|P (p) < t) is well-defined. But since P (p↔ [P (p) < t]) = 1, P (p|P (p) < t) = 1 6< t,
violating Trust (Fact 4.1).
Fact 7.1. In any dynamic probability frame: if Misguided Evidence or Effacing Evidence
are true at a world, Value fails.
Proof. We prove the contrapositive. By Theorem 7.2, if Value holds at a world, then
Informed Trust does as well. And the proofs of Facts 5.4 and 6.1 straightforwardly
generalize to dynamic probability frames: if Informed Trust holds at a world, Misguided
Evidence and Effacing Evidence do not.
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Theorem 7.2. In any dynamic probability frame: if Value holds at a world, Informed
Trust does as well.
Basic idea: Given an Informed Trust failure, we construct a conditional bet that you
expect the informed evidence to warrant making a poor decision on.
Proof. Contraposing, suppose Informed Trust fails: for some p, q, t, i, k with k ≥ i,
P iq(p|P kq (p) ≥ t) < t is true at some world z. Thus P iq(p|P kq (p) ≥ t) = t − a for a > 0.
Define our decision problem such that O = {n, b}; the nope option has 0 value at every
world v, while the b is a conditional bet on p given q. For arbitrarily small  > 0:
Uv(n) = 0 for all v ∈W Uv(b) =

0 if v /∈ q
1− t+  if v ∈ p ∩ q
−t if v ∈ ¬p ∩ q
We first establish (α) : [P kq (p) ≥ t] ⊆ [dk = b] (=df {w|dkw = b}).
Proof. Take arbitrary w such that Pkw(p|q) ≥ t. Since it is well-defined, Pw(q) > 0. We
must show that Ekw[U(n)] < Ekw[U(b)]. Ekw[U(n)] = 0, of course. On the other hand,
Ekw[U(b)] = Pkw(q) · Ekw[U(b)|q] + Pkw(¬q) · Ekw[U(b)|¬q] (Total Expectation)
= Pkw(q) · Ekw[U(b)|q] (Since ¬q ⊆ [U(b) = 0])
So it’ll suffice to show that Ekw[U(b)|q] > 0.
Ekw[U(b)|q] = Pkw(p|q) · (1− t+ ) + Pkw(¬p|q) · (−t)
≥ t · (1− t+ ) + (1− t) · (−t) = t > 0 (Since Pkw(p|q) ≥ t)
Hence Ekw[U(b)|q] > 0, so Ekw[U(b)] > 0 = Ekw[U(n)], and thus dkw = b.
Next we establish that (β) : [P kq (p) < t] ⊆ [dk = n].
Proof. Take any x such that Pkx (p|q) < t. Thus Pkx (p|q) = t− d for some d > 0. (Since
well-defined, Pkx (q) > 0.) Again, Ekx[U(n)] = 0; so we must show that Ekx[U(b)] < 0.
Since Ekx[U(b)|¬q] = 0 as before, we know Ekx[U(b)] = Pkx (q) · Ekx[U(b)|q]. So it’ll suffice
to show that Ekx[U(b)|q] < 0.
Ekx[U(b)|q] = Pkx (p|q) · (1− t+ ) + Pkx (¬p|q) · (−t)
= (t− d) · (1− t+ ) + (1− t+ d) · (−t) = (t− d)− d
As  → 0 the left term vanishes and Ekx[U(b)|q] < 0. It follows that Ekx[U(b)] < 0 =
Ekx[U(n)], hence dkx = n. (Since [P kq (p) < t] is finite, it follows that there is an  small
enough such that, for all x ∈ [P kq (p) < t]: dkx = n.)
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We now turn to showing that at our original world x, Eiz[U(dk)] < 0 = Eiz[U(n)],
and hence that Value fails at z. Since Eiz[U(dk)|¬q] = 0, we know
Eiz[U(dk)] = Piz(q) · Eiz[U(dk)|q]
with Piz(q) > 0. So it’ll suffice to show that Eiz[U(dk)|q] < 0. Since [P kq (p) ≥ t] and
[P kq (p) < t] partition the q-worlds assigned positive probability by z (since Value requires
shift-reflexivity39, and hence that the conditional probability is well-defined), we know
Eiz[U(dk)|q] = Piz(P kq (p) ≥ t|q) · Eiz[U(dk)|q ∧ [P kq (p) ≥ t]]
+ Piz(P kq (p) < t|q) · Eiz[U(dk)|q ∧ [P kq (p) < t]]
(β) implies that [P kq (p) < t] ⊆ [dk = n], so Eiz[U(dk)|q ∧ [P kq (p) < t]] = 0, hence the right
summand drops out:
Eiz[U(dk)|q] = Piz(P kq (p) ≥ t|q) · Eiz[U(dk)|q ∧ [P kq (p) ≥ t]]
Thus it suffices to show that Eiz[U(dk)|q ∧ [P kq (p) ≥ t]] < 0. (α) implies that [P kq (p) ≥
t] ⊆ [dk = b], so it’ll in turn suffice to show that Eiz[U(b)|q ∧ [P kq (p) ≥ t]] < 0. Since
[P iq(p|P kq (p) ≥ t) = t− a] is true at z, Piz(p|q ∧ [P kq (p) ≥ t]) = t− a; hence
Eiz[U(b)|q ∧ [P kq (p) ≥ t]] = Piz(p|q ∧ [P kq (p) ≥ t]) · (1− t+ ) + Piz(¬p|q ∧ [P kq (p) ≥ t]) · (−t)
= (t− a) · (1− t+ ) + (1− t+ a) · (−t) = (t− a)− a
As → 0, the left term vanishes and Eiz[U(b)|q ∧ [P kq (p) ≥ t]] < 0. It follows that
Eiz[U(dk)|q ∧ [P kq (p) ≥ t]] < 0 and hence that Eiz[U(dk)|q] < 0, and hence that
Eiz[U(dk)] < 0 = Eiz[U(n)]. Value fails at z.
Theorem 7.4 (Value ⇔ Trust). The following are equivalent:
(1) The dynamic prior frame 〈W,E1, E2, pi〉 validates Informed Trust.
(2) 〈W,E1, E2〉 is transitive, shift-reflexive, shift-nested, and shift-updating.
(3) The dynamic prior frame 〈W,E1, E2, pi〉 validates Value.
It is immediate from Theorem 7.2 that (3) implies (1); so we must establish two lem-
mas: Lemma 7.4.2 that (1) implies (2), and Lemma 7.4.3 that (2) implies (3). First, we
extend our definitions of transitive, reflexive (etc.) to apply to sets of worlds:
Definition 7.4.1. Given a set q ⊆ W in 〈W,E1, E2〉 and arbitrary x, y ∈ q: q is
transitive iff for any z ∈ W , x ∈ Ekz ⇒ Ekx ⊆ Ekz ; q is reflexive iff xEkx; q is
updating iff E2x ⊆ E1x; q is nested iff (Ekx ⊆ Eky or Ekx ⊇ Eky or Ekx ∩ Eky = ∅). Note
that 〈W,E1, E2〉 is transitive, shift-reflexive, shift-nested, and shift-updating iff each
Eiw is transitive, reflexive, nested, and updating.
39If z sees w but w doesn’t see itself, define a bet which pays off if ¬{w} and has a huge cost −N
if w. Since Pw will warrant taking the bet no matter how large N is, eventually Eiz [U(dk)] < 0, and
Value fails.
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Now we prove that (1) implies (2) in Theorem 7.4.
Lemma 7.4.2. The dynamic prior frame 〈W,E1, E2, pi〉 validates Informed Trust only
if 〈W,E1, E2〉 is transitive, shift-reflexive, shift-nested, and shift-updating.
Proof. We show the contrapositive, using Definition 7.4.1: supposing there is a w with
Eiw not transitive (etc.), we show that Informed Trust fails.
Transitivity: Suppose ∃x ∈ Eiw such that x ∈ Ekz but 6Ekx ⊆ Ekz . By regularity,
[P k(Ekz ) < 1] is true at x. Since Pkz (Ekz ) = 1 and zEkx, Pkz (Ekz
∣∣P k(Ekz ) < 1]) = 1.
Informed Trust fails at z (Fact 4.1).
Reflexivity: Suppose ∃x ∈ Eiw such that 6xEkx. Let p = W−{x}, so [P k(p) = 1] ∧ ¬p
is true at x. Since wEix, Piw(¬p
∣∣P k(p) = 1) > 0, so Piw(p∣∣P k(p) ≥ 1) < 1. Informed Trust
fails.
Updating: We know Eiw is reflexive. Suppose ∃x ∈ Eiw such that E2x 6⊆ E1x, so there is
a y with xE2y but 6xE1y. By the latter, P1x(y) = 0. By the former, [P 2(y) > 0] is true at
x. By reflexivity, xE1x, so P1x(P 2(y) > 0) > 0. Combined, we have P1x(y
∣∣P 2(y) > 0) = 0.
Informed Trust fails.
Nesting: Suppose ∃x, y, z ∈ Eiw with Ekx 6⊆ Eky and Ekx 6⊇ Eky , but z ∈ Ekx ∩ Eky .
We know that Eiw must be transitive, reflexive, and updating; we’ll show that Informed







Since Ek is transitive, we know 6xEky, y 6E kx, and x, y 6E kw. By the definition of t,
[P kq (z) ≥ t] ⊇ {x, y, z} = q ⊆ Eiw, so (α) : q = q ∩ [P kq (z) ≥ t] ∩ Eiw. Now, x, y /∈ Ekz for
otherwise zEkx or zEky, and so (by transitivity) xEky or yEkx—contradiction. Thus:
Pkz (z|q) = Pkz (z|{x, y, z}) = 1. (β)
Moreover, since y /∈ Ekx and x /∈ Eky :
Pkx (z|q) =


















pi({x, y, z}) (by regularity)
= pi(z|q) = pi(z|q ∩ [P kq (z) ≥ t] ∩ Eiw) (by (α))
= Piw(p
∣∣q ∩ [P kq (z) ≥ t])
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That is, P iq(z
∣∣P kq (z) ≥ t) < t at w: Informed Trust fails.
The final step for Theorem 7.4 is showing that that (2) implies (3):
Lemma 7.4.3 (cf. Geanakoplos 1989). If 〈W,E1, E2〉 is transitive, shift-reflexive, shift-
nested, and shift-updating, then 〈W,E1, E2, pi〉 validates Value.
Basic idea: Show that if the frame is transitive, shift-reflexive, shift-nested, and shift-
updating, then we can partition Eiw into smaller “branches,” with expectations from w
an average of the expectations conditional on each branch. Then an induction on the
size of Eiw suffices to carry Value from the “leaves” up through the tree.
Definition 7.4.3.a (k-closed). q ⊆W is k-closed iff for any x ∈ q, Ekx ⊆ q. Note that if
Eiw is transitive and updating, E
i
w is k-closed. (Updating implies that for any x ∈ Eiw,
then E2x ⊆ E1x, so Ekx ⊆ Eix, and by transitivity Eix ⊆ Eiw.)
Definition 7.4.3.b (k-classes). Given a k-closed q ⊆ W , let its set N k of k-classes
partition q into worlds that see the same worlds under Ek: N k =df {N ⊆ q|∀x, y ∈
N : Ekx = E
k
y}. The k-class of a world x is denoted Nkx = {y ∈ q|Eky = Ekx}. We let Ak
denote the k-class whose members see All of q under Ek: Ak =df {x ∈ q|Ekx = q}. (Ak
may be empty.)
Fact 7.4.3.c (k-class accessibility). If q is transitive, reflexive, and k-closed, andN,M ∈
N k, then (∃n ∈ N , m ∈ M : nEkm) iff (∀n ∈ N,m ∈ M : nEkm). (Why? Suppose
nEkm. ∀m′ ∈ M : (reflexivity) m′Ekm′, so (same k-class) mEkm′, so (transitivity)
nEkm′; so (same k-class) ∀n′ ∈ N : n′Ekm′.) Thus within Eiw we can treat Ek as
a relation between k-classes: for N,M ∈ N k : NEkM iff ∃n ∈ N,m ∈ M : nEkm,
iff ∀n ∈ N,m ∈ M : nEkm. Similarly for the neighborhood of a class: EkN =df {x ∈
q|∃y ∈ N : Eky = Ekx} = {x ∈ q|∀y ∈ N : Eky = Ekx}. Note: by reflexivity and
transitivity: NEkM iff EkM ⊆ EkN ; and EkM ⊂ EkN iff NEkM and N 6= M .
Definition 7.4.3.d (Maximal k-classes). Given a transitive, reflexive, and k-closed q,
the maximal k-classes of q are those that see strictly less than q under Ek but are not
seen by any other k-classes that do so: {M ∈ N k|EkM ⊂ q and ¬∃K ∈ N k : EkM ⊂ EkK ⊂ q}.
Fact 7.4.3.e. If q is transitive, reflexive, nested, and k-closed, and M1, ...,Mn are its
maximal k-classes, then it is partitioned by {Ak, EkM1 , ..., EkMn}.
Proof. Exhaustivity: Take arbitrary x ∈ q. By reflexivity, x ∈ Nkx . If EkNkx 6⊂ q, then
EkNkx
= q, so x ∈ Ak, hence covered by {Ak, EkM1 , ..., EkMn}. So suppose EkNkx ⊂ q; we
show that x ∈ EkMj for some maximalMj . By reflexivity x ∈ Ekx , soNkxEkNkx . Therefore
there must be an node Mj that’s maximal and MjE
kNkx . For suppose not: there is no
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K ∈ N k such that EkK ⊂ q, KEkNkx , and (by definition of maximal) ¬∃K ′ ∈ N k : EkK ⊂
EkK′ ⊂ q, i.e.
∀K ∈ N k : if EkK ⊂ q and KEkNkx then ∃K ′ ∈ N k : EkK ⊂ EkK′ ⊂ q. (α)
But this blows up the size of q. Since q is finite, suppose |q| = m. Setting K = Nkx , we
have EkNkx
⊂ q and NkxEkNkx ; therefore by (α) there is a K ′ with EkNkx ⊂ E
k
K′ ⊂ q. Since
EkNkx
⊂ EkK′ , K ′EkNkx . But then setting K = K ′ we have EkK′ ⊂ q and K ′EkNkx , so
by (α) again we get a K ′′ such that EkK′ ⊂ EkK′′ ⊂ q. By iterating this, we prove that
|q| > m. Contradiction. Thus there must be a maximal node Mj that accesses Nkx , and
hence accesses x. Thus x ∈ EkMj , as desired.
Exclusivity: If there is an x ∈ Ak∩EkMj , then MjEkAk so by transitivity EkMj 6⊂ q.
Contradiction. So Ak is disjoint from all the EkMl . Next, take any Ml 6= Mj , with
ml ∈ Ml and mj ∈ Mj . If mlEkmj or mjEkml, then either they access each other (so
by transitivity Ml = Mj—contradiction) or only one accesses the other—WLOG, say
mlE
kmj . Since mlE
kml but 6mjEkml, by transitivity Ekmj ⊂ Ekml ⊂ q, contradicting
the assumption that Mj is maximal. Thus ml and mj do not access each other, so by
nestedness Ekml ∩ Ekmj = ∅, i.e. EkMl and EkMj are disjoint.
Definition 7.4.3.f . Given a dynamic prior frame 〈W,E1, E2, pi〉 and any random
variable X, let Eq[X] (= E[X|q]) be the expectation of X relative to pi conditional on q:
Eq[X] =df
∑
t pi(X = t|q) · t. And let piq =df pi(·|q).
Fact 7.4.3.g. If q is k-closed, transitive, reflexive, and nested, then any k-closed r ⊆ q
is also transitive, reflexive, and nested.
Proof. Let x, y ∈ r. Transitive: Suppose ∃z ∈W such that x ∈ Ekz . Since x ∈ q and q is
transitive, if xEky then zEky. Reflexive: Since x ∈ q and q is reflexive, xEkx. Nested:
since x, y ∈ q, either Ekx ⊆ Eky or Ekx ⊇ Eky or Ekx ∩ Eky = ∅.
Lemma 7.4.3.h. If q is k-closed, transitive, reflexive, and nested, then for any decision
problem 〈O,U〉 and any d and o ∈ O: Eq[U(dk)] ≥ Eq[U(o)].
Proof. We proceed by induction on the size of q. Base case: If |q| = 1, then q = {x}.
Since q is k-closed and reflexive, Ekx = {x}, so pi(·|q) = Pkx ; so for any random variable X,









; hence Eq[U(dk)] ≥ Eq[U(o)].
Induction case: Suppose |q| = n and for all r ⊆ W with |r| < |q|, the hypothesis
holds. By Fact 7.4.3.e, if M1, ...,Ml are q’s maximal k-classes, then q can be partitioned
by {Ak, EkM1 , ..., EkMl}. We thus can break down Eq[U(o)] as follows:





Mj )Eq[U(o)|EkMj ] (α)
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Mj )Eq[U(o)|EkMj ] (β)
Since each EkMj ⊂ q and q is transitive and k-closed, EkMj is k-closed. By Fact 7.4.3.g,
EkMj is also transitive, reflexive, and nested. Since it is smaller than q, the inductive
hypothesis holds and E[U(dk)|EkMj ] ≥ E[U(o)|EkMj ]. And since q ∩EkMj = EkMj , for any







k)|EkMj ] = Eq[U(dk)]
That is, Eq[U(o)] ≤ Eq[U(dk)], as desired.
Next suppose Ak 6= ∅, so we have some w ∈ Ak such that Ekw = q. Then piq = Pkw,
Eq[X] = Ekw[X]; and so by the definition of dkw we have:




Pkw(EkMj )Ekw[U(dkw)|EkMj ] (γ)
Since for any x ∈ Ak, Pkx = Pkw, we know dkx = dkw. Hence Ekw[U(dkw)|Ak] = Ekw[U(dk)|Ak].




w)|EkMj ] ≤ Ekw[U(dk)|EkMj ].




Pkw(EkMj )Ekw[U(dk)|EkMj ] = Ekw[U(dk]
And since Ekw[U(dk)] = Eq[U(dk)], we have the desired result.
We are finally in a position to complete the proof of Theorem 7.4 by establishing
Lemma 7.4.3.
Lemma 7.4.3 (cf. Geanakoplos 1989). If 〈W,E1, E2〉 is transitive, shift-reflexive, shift-
nested, and shift-updating, then 〈W,E1, E2, pi〉 validates Value.
Proof. Suppose 〈W,E1, E2〉 is transitive, shift-reflexive, shift-nested, and shift-updating,
and consider an arbitrary prior frame 〈W,E1, E2, pi〉 built on it. Consider an arbitrary
world w. By Definitions 7.4.1 and 7.4.3.a, Eiw is k-closed, transitive, reflexive, and
nested. Thus Lemma 7.4.3.h applies: for any decision problem 〈O,U〉 and any d and
o ∈ O: E[U(dk)|Eiw] ≥ E[U(o)|Eiw]; that is, Eiw[U(dk)] ≥ Eiw[U(o)]: Value holds.
Recall our disagreement setup:
(1) S([P (Top) = h] ∨ [P (Top) = l]) (h > l)
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(2) P (Top) = h
(3) P (P (Top) = t|CD(Top) = t) > P (P (Top) = t)
(4) P (Top|[P (Top) = t] ∧ [CD(Top) = s]) = P (Top|P (Top) = t).
Fact 8.1. (1)–(4) are consistent with P (Top|CD(Top) < h) ≥ P (Top). But given Trust,
(1)–(4) imply P (Top|CD(Top) < h) < P (Top).
Proof. Our model of (1)-(4) will be based on the Sycophants frame. W = {s, p}. P(s) =
Ps such that Ps(s) = 0.1 and Ps(p) = 0.9. Similarly, P(p) = Pp such that Pp(p) = 0.1
and Pp(s) = 0.9. Set Top = p and h = 0.9. At world s, S([P (p) = 0.9] ∨ [P (p) = 0.1]) and
[P (p) = 0.9] are true, so (1) and (2) are satisfied. Enrich this model with a function
D from worlds to Disa’s credences; and set D(w) = Pw for each w. Then S([CD(q) =
t] ↔ [P (q) = t]) is valid. Thus P (P (p) = t|CD(p) = t) = 1 > .9 ≥ P (P (p) = t), so (3) is
satisfied. Finally, since S([P (p) = t]↔ [CD(p) = t]) is valid, P (p|[P (p) = t] ∧ [CD(p) = s]) =
P (p|P (p) = t) if well-defined, so (4) is satisfied. Nevertheless, P (p|CD(p) < .9) =
P (p|P (p) < .9) = 1 ≥ .9 = P (p), establishing the first result.
Now suppose Trust holds and (1)–(4) are true. Let q = [CD(Top) < h]. Then
P (Top|CD(Top) < h) = Pq(Top) can be broken down:
= Pq(P (Top) = l)Pq(Top|P (Top) = l) + Pq(P (Top) = h)Pq(Top|P (Top) = h) [by (1)]
= Pq(P (Top) = l)P (Top|P (Top) = l) + Pq(P (Top) = h)P (Top|P (Top) = h) [by (4)]
From (3) it follows that P (P (Top) = l|CD(Top) < h) = Pq(P (Top) = l) > P (P (Top) = l)
and Pq(P (Top) = h) > P (P (Top) = h). Since
P (Top) = P (P (Top) = l)P (Top|P (p) = l) + P (P (Top) = h)P (Top|P (p) = h)
Pq(Top) is weighted more towards P (Top|P (p) = l) than P (Top) is. Since by (1),
P (Top|P (Top) = l) = P (Top|P (Top) ≤ l) ≤ l (by Trust), and l < h ≤ P (Top|P (Top) ≥ h) =
P (Top|P (Top) = h), it follows that Pq(Top) is more weighted towards the lower value than
P (Top) is, so Pq(Top) = P (Top|CD(Top) < h) < P (Top).
Fact 8.2. In any probability frame: if Value or Trust hold at a world, then Sp→ SSp
does as well.
Proof. By Theorem 7.2, it suffices to show the result for Trust. For reductio, suppose
Sp and ¬SSp are true, so [P (p) = 1] yet P (P (p) = 1) < 1. By the latter, P (p|P (p) < 1)
is well-defined; by the former, P (p|P (p) < 1) = 1, violating Trust.
C. Glossary
This glossary collects brief definitions of the technical terms used in the statements of
principles and theorems, in alphabetical order.
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· Candidate: pi is a candidate in frame 〈W,P〉 iff at some world you should think pi
might be the rational credence function: ∃w ∈W : Pw(P = pi) > 0.
· Conditionable: A frame 〈W,E〉 is conditionable iff we can define a two-place pro-
positional connective  such that (a) P (p|q) = 1 implies P (q p) = 1, and (b) for
q 6= ∅, P (q p) = 1 implies P (q ¬p) < 1.
· d: Given a frame plus decision problem 〈F,O,U〉, d is (a variable over) any function
from evidence k to a functions dk from worlds w to options dkw ∈ O such that (1)




and (2) if Pix = Pky , then dix = dky .
· Decision Problem 〈O,U〉: A set of options O and a real-valued utility function U ;
Uw(o) is the utility of o ∈ O at w.40
· Dynamic Prior Frame 〈W,E1, E2, pi〉: A dynamic probability frame 〈W,P1,P2〉
in which there is a regular probability distribution pi over W—the prior—such that
for all w: Piw = pi(·|Eiw).
· Dynamic Probability Frame 〈W,P1,P2〉: A probability frame with an extra
function P2; it associates each possibility w with a credence function P1w that’s
rational given evidence 1 and P2w that’s rational given evidence 2.







· wEiw′, Eiw: Given a dynamic probability frame 〈W,P1,P2〉, wEiw′ iff Piw(w′) > 0
and Eiw =df {w′|Piw(w′) > 0}. In probability frames the superscripts are omitted.
· Frame: A structure 〈W,E〉 underlying a prior frame 〈W,E, pi〉. W is finite; E is
serial: ∀x∃y : xEy.
· Holds: A principle holds at world w iff all of its instances (well-defined instantiations
of free variables) are true at w.
· i and k: Convention: when using multiple variables over bodies of evidence, i and
k obey the constraint that k ≥ i.
· Informed: A body of evidence is informed (with respect to yours) iff it contains all
your evidence, and maybe more.
· Informed Trust: P iq(p|P kq (p) ≥ t) ≥ t (k ≥ i)
· Judgment: You judge that p iff you have a credence in p above the given (contex-
tually specified) threshold t.
· Misguided Evidence: ∃p, t : P (p ∧ [P (p) < t]) ≥ t
· Nested: A frame 〈W,E〉 is nested iff for any x, y: either Ex ⊆ Ey or Ex ⊇ Ey or
Ex ∩ Ey = ∅.
· Opinion: You have a given opinion about p iff you have a credence in p in the given
(contextually specified) range [l, h].
40For 〈O,U〉 to enrich a frame with set of worlds W , 〈O,U〉 must be such that for any pi over W
there is at least one option with maximal pi-expected utility: maxo∈O(Epi [U(o)]) is non-empty.
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· pi: A probability function whose values (unlike P ) are known. piq =df pi(·|q).
· Pw: The probability function which is rational at world w; it’s values are known.
· [P i(p) = t] : Given a dynamic probability frame, [P i(p) = t] =df {w|Piw(p) = t}.
In probability frames the superscript is omitted.
· Pq(p) (= P (p|q)): The rational credence—whatever it is—in p conditional on q.
· Prior Frame 〈W,E, pi〉: A probability frame 〈W,P〉 in which there is a regular
probability distribution pi over W (i.e. ∀w ∈ W : pi(w) > 0) such that for all w:
Pw = pi(·|Ew).
· Probability Frame 〈W,P〉: A structure consisting of a finite set of epistemic
possibilities W and a function P that associates each possibility w with the rational
credences Pw that you should have at w.
· Reaction: If Pq
(
Pq(p) ∈ [l, h]
)
= 1, then Pq(p) ∈ [l, h]
· Reasoning-generable: A frame 〈W,E〉 is reasoning-generable iff there is a function
f from worlds w to sequences of propositions f(w) such that: wEx iff f(w) is an initial
segment of f(x).
· Reflection: P (p|P (p) ∈ [l, h]) ∈ [l, h]
· Reliance: Pq(p|Pq(p) ≥ t) ≥ Pq(p)
· Reflexive: A frame 〈W,E〉 is reflexive iff for all x: xEx.
· Shift-Nested: A dynamic frame 〈W,E1, E2〉 is shift-nested iff wEix, y ⇒ (Ekx ⊆ Eky
or Ekx ⊇ Eky or Ekx ∩ Eky = ∅). (For a frame 〈W,E〉, omit the superscripts.)
· Shift-Reflexive: A dynamic frame 〈W,E1, E2〉 is shift-reflexive iff xEiy ⇒ yEky.
(For a frame 〈W,E〉, omit the superscripts.)
· Shift-Updating: A dynamic frame 〈W,E1, E2〉 is shift-updating iff xEiy ⇒ E2y ⊆ E1y .
· Sp: Sp iff you should be Sure of p, iff P (p) = 1.
· Transitive: A dynamic frame 〈W,E1, E2〉 is transitive iff (xEiy ∧ yEiz) ⇒ xEiz.
(For a frame 〈W,E〉, omit the superscripts.)
· Trust: Pq(p|Pq(p) ≥ t) ≥ t
· Validates: A frame validates a principle iff the principle is true at all worlds for all
well-defined instantiations of its free variables.
· Value: Ei[U(dk)] ≥ Ei[U(o)] (o ∈ O, k ≥ i)
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